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Kauppapakotteet ovat valtioiden välisessä toiminnassa yleisesti hyödynnetty voimankäytön muoto. Kauppapakotteilla kuten 
kohdennetuilla tuonti- ja vientikielloilla pyritään saavuttamaan valtioiden lähtökohtaisesti julkisoikeudellisia tavoitteita ja aset-
tamaan painetta toisia valtioita kohtaan. Niillä on kuitenkin myös välittömiä vaikutuksia yksityisten välisissä oikeussuhteissa, 
koska ne tavanomaisesti pyrkivät estämään yksityisten toimijoiden välisen kaupankäynnin ja liiketoiminnan. Suuri osa liike-
elämän sopimuksista sisältää välityslausekkeen, jonka myötä sopimuksesta seuraavat riidat tulee ratkaista välimiesmenet-
telyssä. Täten myös välimies voi joutua ottamaan kantaa pakotteiden vaikutukseen osapuolten välisessä sopimussuhteessa. 
Tässä tutkielmassa kysytään, kuinka pakotteet vaikuttavat välimiesmenettelyn lainvalintaan ordre public -säännöksinä ja 
toisaalta sitä, kuinka suomalainen tuomioistuin voi huomioida pakotteet välitystuomion mahdollisen mitättömyyskanteen tai 
ulkomaisen välitystuomion täytäntöönpanon yhteydessä. 
 
Yksi kansainvälisen välimiesmenettelyn perusperiaatteista on se, että osapuolilla tulee olla mahdollisuus sopia heidän väli-
sessä suhteessa sovellettavasta menettelystä mukaan lukien siihen soveltuvista oikeussäännöistä. Lähtökohtaisesti väli-
miehen tulisi siis soveltaa osapuolten valitsemaa lakia eikä huomioida sen ulkopuolista sääntelyä kuten ulkomaisia kauppa-
pakotteita. Osapuolten tahdonautonomian periaatteen orjallinen noudattaminen voisi johtaa kuitenkin kohtuuttomiin lopputu-
loksiin, joten kirjallisuudessa ja välimieskäytännössä on syntynyt useita erilaisia metodeita tiettyjen ulkomaisten pakottavien 
sääntöjen huomioimiseen. Erityisesti YK:n asettamat monenkeskiset pakotteet voivat tulla sovellettaviksi siten, että välimies 
turvautuu kansainvälisesti laajalti jaettuihin keskeisiin oikeudenmukaisuuden periaatteisiin (transnational public policy). Mah-
dollista on myös huomioida ulkomaiset pakotteet esimerkiksi soveltuvan lain force majeure –käsitteen kautta, jolloin ulko-
maisia pakotteita ei tarvitse välttämättä suoranaisesti soveltaa kolmannen valtion lakina, vaan ne voivat ainoastaan vaikuttaa 
muutoin soveltuvan lain tulkinnassa. Useimmissa tapauksissa tämä onkin toivottavin ratkaisu. Toisaalta eräissä tapauksissa 
ulkomaisten pakotteiden on katsottu olevan myös niin sanottuja kolmannen valtion pakottavia säännöksiä, jotka tulevat so-
vellettavaksi vain tiettyjen ehtojen täyttyessä. 
 
Välimiehen antama välitystuomio on lähtökohtaisesti pysyvä, eikä kansallisilla tuomioistuimilla ole oikeutta puuttua sen ai-
neelliseen sisältöön. Mikäli välitystuomio on kuitenkin tuon tuomioistuinvaltion oikeusjärjestyksen perusteiden vastainen (nk. 
ordre public tai public policy -poikkeus), voidaan se tuomioistuinmenettelyssä mitätöidä. Samoin tuomioistuin voi kieltäytyä 
tunnustamasta ja panemasta täytäntöön sellaista ulkomaista välitystuomiota, joka on sen maan oikeusjärjestyksen perustei-
den vastainen. Kauppapakotteet saattavat tällä tavoin tietyissä tilanteissa aiheuttaa välitystuomion mitättömyyden tai tehdä 
välitystuomion täytäntöönpanon mahdottomaksi. Jos välitystuomiossa ei ole huomioitu sellaista kauppapakotetta, jonka 
Suomi on osana EU:n yhteistä ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa hyväksynyt, ja pakotteen huomiotta jättäminen johtaisi Suomen 
oikeusjärjestyksen perusteiden vastaiseen lopputulemaan, tulee kansallisen tuomioistuimen puuttua välitystuomion pysy-
vyyteen. Sellaiset pakotteet, jotka eivät ole osa Suomen oikeusjärjestystä eli käytännössä ulkomaiseen lakiin perustuvat 
pakotteet eivät voi lähtökohtaisesti aiheuttaa tällä tavoin välitystuomion mitättömyyttä tai sen tunnustamisen ja täytäntöön-
panon epäämistä. 
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1 Introduction 
 Introductory remarks 
1.1.1 Introduction to trade sanctions 
Trade sanctions, such as export and import restrictions aimed against the sanctioned state, 
have experienced a surge in popularity in recent years. They are regularly used to impose 
political and economic pressure, and to punish undesirable behavior by other states. Since 
the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, the United Nations (“UN”) has taken an active role in 
imposing non-military sanctions regimes against governments or individuals that have 
presented a threat to peace and international security. These measures have included i.a. the 
sanctions against Yugoslavia in 19921, arms and petrol embargoes against Angolan rebels in 
19932  and Rwanda in 1995,3 as well as the sanctions regime against Iran set in 2007–2012, 
including arms embargo and limitations to trade of nuclear technologies4. Besides UN-
mandated sanctions, a number of countries have imposed their unilateral, autonomous trade 
sanctions outside the auspices of the UN to further their own political or economic goals or 
to take more extensive measures than required against countries sanctioned by the UN. 
The Ukrainian crisis and the following freeze in Russo-Western relations from 2014 onwards 
have launched new rounds of notable economic sanctions and countersanctions that have 
already affected the trade between the western world and Russia.5 The first disputes seem to 
be raising their heads.6  Unlike previous sanctions regimes, typically designated against 
minor rogue states or at most regional actors, the sanctions against Russia are imposed by a 
                                                 
1 UNSC Resolution S/RES/820. 
2 UNSC Resolution S/RES/864. 
3 UNSC Resolution S/RES/1011. 
4  UNSC Resolutions S/RES/1696, S/RES/1737, S/RES/1747, S/RES/1803, S/RES/1835, S/RES/1929, 
S/RES/1984 and S/RES/2049. The sanctions against Iran are about to be lifted given that Iran complies with 
the limitations on nuclear activities. See Financial Times, 14 July 2015 and the related UNSC Resolution 
S/RES/2231.  
5 See i.a. Valtionvarainministeriö 2015, p. 15, stating that the exports of foodstuffs from Finland to Russia 
subtracted from EUR 103.3 million in 2013 to EUR 28.5 million in 2014, after the Russian Federation had 
imposed import restrictions on foreign foodstuffs. The EU has also prohibited the import of all goods 
originating from the Crimea or Sevastopol. See Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014. 
6 See i.a. the arising, yet later settled dispute on the delivery of French Mistral class warships to Russia, The 
Economist, May 15th 2015.  
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number of European states, including Finland, and target a major trading partner of Finland. 
The current situation has raised the legal questions surrounding trade sanctions on the agenda 
in Finland. 
Although all trade sanctions are mainly geared towards changing the behavior of the target 
state and its administration, trade sanctions also necessarily have an impact on the 
contractual relations between private individuals involved in international trade with or 
within the target state. The imposed trade sanctions may render the contractual performance 
of one or more contracting parties impossible and thus give rise to contractual disputes. 
Today, the majority of players in international trade opt to resolve their disputes outside of 
national courts in international arbitration tribunals, which claim to offer an impartial, 
independent, proficient, confidential, and expeditious manner to settle these disagreements. 
For these reasons, trade sanctions related disputes are also often subjected to international 
arbitration.  
1.1.2 International arbitration, party autonomy and public policies 
International arbitration is essentially a consensual mode of dispute resolution and based on 
an agreement to arbitrate. An arbitrator is not a state judiciary, does not have a forum or lex 
fori and is therefore not bound by the mandatory provisions of national material law of the 
place of arbitration.7 The law of the place of arbitration, the lex arbitri, may however have 
some effect on the parties' contract and the procedure between them, either during the arbitral 
proceedings or during possible setting aside proceedings. 
The parties are as a general rule free to rule agree on virtually all aspects of their arbitral 
procedure, including the place of arbitration and the applicable legal rules to their contract 
and the possible disputes arising out of it (lex causae). The principle of party autonomy, the 
freedom of the parties to arrange their mutual rights and obligations between themselves is 
said to be the leading principle in international arbitration.8 Certain exceptions to this general 
principle of party autonomy may nonetheless apply. Sometimes national legislators hold that 
                                                 
7 Regarding state judiciaries' obligation to follow the rules of the forum, see i.a. Article 9(2) Rome I Regulation 
and Article 7(2) Rome Convention. 
8 Generally on the significance of party-autonomy in international arbitration, see i.a. Lew 1978, pp. 86–102 
and Redfern et al. 2009, pp. 195–198. 
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certain categories of disputes, such as those relating to family law or criminal law, should be 
heard before national courts rather than arbitral tribunals, hence denying the arbitrability of 
these disputes. 9  Other times arbitrability is granted but the arbitrators are expected to 
consider certain mandatory principles or rules of law, public policies, which ought to be 
respected, even if the parties had agreed otherwise or even chosen a law that would not 
contain such restrictions. If these mandatory rules are not respected, the arbitrator will risk 
having the award set aside or refused recognition.10 An arbitrator may in these cases be faced 
with a conflict between the will of the State having promulgated the mandatory rule of law, 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the will of the parties11. 
The exact definition and scope of public policy is not easily defined. The public policy 
exception has been said to be notoriously difficult to define,12 and been described as a black 
hole in the system of arbitral jurisdiction because of the fact that it may be invoked by the 
parties in the most imaginative contexts. 13  The fact that in the case of international 
arbitration, public policy argumentation is applied virtually only in an international context 
yet ultimately based on municipal law, complicates the matter even further. Nonetheless, a 
definition by D. M. Lew offers a solid starting point for examining the matters of public 
policy: 
“... [Public policy] reflects the fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, 
religious and social standards of every State or extra-national community. 
Naturally public policy differs according to the character and structure of the 
State or community to which it appertains, and covers those principles and 
standards which are so sacrosanct as to require their maintenance at all costs 
and without exception.”14 
It should be noted already at this stage that trade sanctions claiming extraterritorial 
application, issued by a state or an extra-national community such as the UN, embodied in a 
                                                 
9 See i.a. Section 2 FAA, limiting the arbitrability of disputes under Finnish law to civil or commercial matters 
which can be settled by agreement. 
10 See chapter 3 below. 
11 Mayer 1986, p. 275. 
12 ILA Interim Report, p. 4. 
13 Koulu 2007, p. 249. 
14 Lew 1978, p. 532. 
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law other than the one governing the parties' contract, may in certain cases be considered as 
such public policy. Public policies may take either a positive or a negative function.15 When 
performing the positive function, the notion of public policy allows the application of a rule 
of law foreign to the otherwise applicable law. For example, the arbitrator or the enforcement 
judge could apply a trade sanction outside the choice of law by the parties. The negative 
function on the other hand allows the non-application of such provisions of the applicable 
law that would run counter to the interests protected by the public policies. Hence, if a 
sanction in the applicable law is deemed discriminatory, its application may be avoided 
through the public policy exception. As will be shown below, both facets of the public policy 
exception may become applicable in relation to trade sanctions: the trade sanctions may be 
applied as public policy rules despite a contrary choice of law, or alternatively, the otherwise 
applicable sanction may be barred applicability on the basis that its application would 
contravene public policy.  
If an arbitrator fails to consider a trade sanction there still remains the possibility that a 
national court would give the sanction effect in setting aside or recognition and enforcement 
proceedings. As a matter of principle, national judiciaries are not allowed to review arbitral 
awards on their merits, but in certain cases, when the outcome of the award would run 
counter to the public policy standards of the concerned state, a limited review may be 
possible. 16  In these cases, the national judiciaries may set the award aside or refuse 
recognition and enforcement only when the award has failed to consider some essential 
provision of the law of that judiciary, or when it has considered a foreign rule of law whose 
application would constitute a breach of a fundamental principle at the place of the court 
review.17  
As a preliminary terminological remark, it must be underlined that the concept of mandatory 
rules, or public policy rules, in private international law and arbitration differs from that of 
purely national situations.18 Mandatory rules and public policy rules in the context of this 
                                                 
15 See i.a. Lalive 1987, pp. 261–264. 
16 As regards Finnish law, see HE 202/1991 vp, p. 8. 
17 See i.a. Sections 40(1)(2) and 52(2) FAA. 
18  On the demarcation between public policy and mandatory rules, and their meanings within private 
international law and arbitration law, see chapter 3.2 below. At this point it suffices to quote Pierre Mayer's 
definition. According to him: "[M]andatory rules of law are a matter of public policy (ordre public), and 
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study shall refer to internationally mandatory or overriding mandatory rules that allow the 
judge not only to escape the contractual clauses that would be contrary to the domestic 
imperative provisions of law but also to disregard the otherwise valid choice of law by the 
parties, given that its application would result in a violation of public policy.19 Therefore, in 
this study, references to mandatory rules or public policy rules should be understood as 
references to these types of internationally mandatory rules and international public policy, 
respectively. 
  Research questions and scope of study 
Trade sanctions in international trade is a distinctively multifaceted and interdisciplinary 
topic that may be approached from a number of different angles. Political scientists and 
economists have established a notable body of research relating to the effects and 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. 20  The legal questions too have given rise to a 
considerable amount of research, pertaining to issues related to numerous fields of law: 
public international law21, EU law22, contract law and law of obligations23, and private 
international law as well as international procedural law24. This study examines the issues of 
trade sanctions from the point of view of international arbitration and mostly focuses on the 
two last mentioned fields of law, i.e. on the choice of law issues and questions pertaining to 
setting aside, recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. Questions pertaining to EU 
law, contract law, and public international law will be touched upon to the extent 
understanding them is necessary to understand the core issues of this study. 
                                                 
moreover reflect a public policy so commanding that they must be applied even if the general body of law to 
which they belong is not competent by application of the relevant rule of conflict of laws." Mayer 1986, p. 275. 
19 In this way, the positive function of the public policy exception closely resembles the exception of overriding 
mandatory rules, as it is known within private international law, most notably in relation to Rome Convention 
and the Rome I Regulation. This relationship is discussed in more detail below in chapter 3.2. Furthermore, as 
regards the distinction between ordre public interne (public policy applicable to national disputes) and ordre 
public externe (public policy as it is applied in international disputes), as they are known within the French 
legal tradition, all references to public policy shall be understood as references to the latter type of public 
policy, unless again specifically otherwise stated. See Taivalkoski 1997, p. 178 according to who Finnish 
arbitration law does not in fact know the category of ordre public interne. 
20 See i.a. Portela 2010. 
21 See i.a. Farrall 2007 and chapter 4.3 below. 
22 See i.a. Portela 2010 and chapter 3.4.2 below. 
23 See i.a. Brunner 2008 and Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 197–352. 
24 See i.a. Azeredo da Silveira, pp. 35–190 and Marchand 2012, pp. 65–233. 
 6 
For the sake of clarity, it should be emphasized that trade sanctions (and any other public 
policies, for that matter) may have an effect on decision-making on two separate levels: 
1. in arbitral proceedings by the arbitrators; 
and/or 
2. in national courts in relation to: 
a.  enforcement and recognition proceedings of a foreign award; or 
b.  setting aside proceedings.25 
This study is bipartite in the sense that it discusses trade sanctions in both arbitral tribunals 
as well as in setting aside and recognition and enforcement proceedings. Following this 
distinction, this study tries to shed light on two distinct main research questions, formulated 
as follows: 
1. Can Finnish courts set aside or refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award on a public policy basis if that award has failed to consider relevant trade 
sanctions, or conversely, considered a trade sanction the application of which would 
be against Finnish public policy?  
2. Are international arbitrators allowed, or obligated, to take foreign trade sanctions into 
account, and conversely, are they allowed to disregard certain trade sanctions in the 
otherwise applicable law if such sanctions would contravene public policies? If yes, 
how and under what conditions?26 
                                                 
25 A terminological matter should be noted here. Unlike for example the Article 34(2) UNCITRAL Model Law, 
Finnish as well as Swedish arbitration acts make a distinction between invalidity (mitättömyys, Section 40 
FAA) and setting aside (kumoaminen, Section 41 FAA) of an award. Under FAA, a conflict with Finnish public 
policy leads to the invalidity of the award, whereas under Article 34 UNCITRAL Model Law, the public policy 
exception is treated merely as a grounds for setting aside the award. The distinction between setting aside and 
invalidity does however largely correspond to the distinction between the grounds that have to be invoked by 
parties and those that are applied ex officio by the court, as set out in Articles 34(2)(a) and 34(2)(b) of the 
Model Law (Sekolec – Eliasson 2006, p. 236) The difference is thus not of very much practical relevance. 
References to "setting aside" in this study will therefore include references to the invalidity in the context of 
Finnish or Swedish procedures, unless specifically noted otherwise. Interestingly it may be noted that the 
travaux préparatoires of the upcoming reform of the Swedish Arbitration Act (the “SAA”) suggest that the 
distinction between setting aside and annulment will be removed from the Swedish legislation as well, leaving 
the Finnish law an international peculiarity. See SOU 2015:37, pp. 125–126. 
26 Chronologically one could be tempted to invert the order of the research questions and consider choice of 
law issues first and only after that dwell into matters of judicial setting aside or recognition and enforcement 
proceedings. However, since the arbitrator may preventively wish to consider and predict the actions of the 
national judiciaries in these proceedings (see chapter 4.5.3 below), the order of the research questions is 
inverted so that issues of setting aside and recognition and enforcement are covered first. 
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Both research questions are closely linked to and revolve around the problematics of public 
policies and mandatory rules in international arbitration, a topic that has at least on the 
international level inspired an abundance of discussion and literature.27 They are essentially 
questions of balancing the state's security and political interests with the freedom of 
commerce and private party interests. Read together, the answers to the two research 
questions should shed light on how these interests should be balanced and whether the 
arbitrators or national judges should bear the responsibility of balancing the competing 
interests. Although the two research questions are in this way inherently linked to each other, 
the questions may and must nonetheless be approached from different angles. The first 
research question pertaining to annulation and recognition issues is better approached from 
a national law oriented, international procedural law perspective. The second research 
question, on the other hand, lies in the realm of private international law and arbitral choice 
of law, a distinctively international, even supranational topic. Both perspectives operate with 
the same or similar concepts, such as with the notion of public policy, but one must 
nonetheless pay special attention when transferring concepts from the auspices of one realm 
to another since the underlying rationale of each system of law is somewhat different. 
Some earlier studies have been carried out to illuminate the issues of trade sanctions in 
arbitration and in national court proceedings.28 Unlike most of these previous studies, this 
study does not discuss trade sanction in national courts as such. Trade sanctions in national 
courts are only discussed to the extent they relate to setting aside or recognition and 
enforcement proceedings, and to the extent they may serve as a source for analogy for 
arbitration related issues. Disregarding choice of law issues in national judiciaries and 
concentrating on arbitration helps to avoid the terminological confusion that necessarily 
ensues when transferring concepts within and between the realms of private international 
law and international arbitration. Also unlike the previous studies, this study does not dwell 
on the matters of material application of trade sanctions but rather retains to matters of choice 
of law and enforceability. Therefore, no suggestions are made as to how the trade sanctions 
should materially affect the parties' contractual relationship.  
                                                 
27 Some introductory, comprehensive or oft-quoted articles, see i.a. Barraclough–Waincymer 2005, Blessing 
1997, Lalive 1987 and Mayer 1986.  
28 See most notably, Azeredo da Silveira 2014, Brunner 2008 and Marchand 2012. 
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This study is divided into five main chapters. After this first, introductory chapter, the second 
main chapter aims to clarify and systematize different categories of trade sanctions, issued 
by various different actors and having varying legal effects. Understanding the different 
types of trade sanctions and their differences is essential in understanding their application 
in arbitral and court proceedings. The research questions provided above will be mainly 
answered in chapters 3 and 4, answering research questions 1 and 2 respectively. The third 
chapter thus discusses the significance and effect of trade sanctions in setting aside and 
recognition and enforcement proceedings of arbitral awards. Here main focus will be on the 
state of the law in Finland. The fourth chapter will then discuss trade sanctions as they are 
applied by international arbitrators and the effect the sanctions may have on the choice of 
law in international arbitration. The fifth and final chapter of this study summarizes what 
has been presented in the first four chapters and presents some brief concluding remarks.  
 Research method 
The primary method of this study is legal dogmatic, meaning that the subject of the research 
is the current state of law and the fundamental goal is to produce norm propositions, and to 
reduce the multiplicity of legal system into general sentences from which solutions to further 
questions can be sought.29 The utilized legal dogmatic method has two sides or tasks, which 
together form its core area: 
1. The systematization of the legal order by means of legal concepts; and 
2. The interpretation of the legal order by means of exploring their substance.30 
Both tasks are employed for the purposes of this study. The systematization task, envisioning 
a kind of "concept tree" in which the basic set of concepts needed has been set in a 
hierarchical order31, is of particular importance, especially when discussing the second 
research question, trade sanctions and the choice of law issues in international arbitration. 
Since arbitral procedure, including its choice of law issues, is only lightly regulated, the 
researcher investigating these matters will have to structure a number of concepts into a 
deliberate structure, just in order to be able to interpret these provisions. Systematization is 
                                                 
29 Aarnio 1977, p. 227 and 273 and Hirvonen 2011, p. 24. 
30 Aarnio 1978, p. 52. 
31 Aarnio 1977, p. 267. 
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needed in order to have a general framework within which one is able to make legal 
interpretations.32 In the terminology of Aarnio, one could state that the basic system33 of 
international arbitration allows a number of conceivable interpretations of its norms, which 
are vague and unspecific by nature.34 When there are "systematic deficiencies" in the basic 
system, as there obviously are in the system of choice of law in international arbitration, the 
systematization has an important creative task, essential for unveiling the alternative 
solutions and the arguments that may be used to justify them.35 Hence, especially as regards 
the second research question, the task of systematization plays an extremely vital role. 
Indeed, the systematic deficiencies in the choice of law in international arbitration may be 
traced back to a discussion regarding the very nature of international arbitration and the 
source of its legitimacy. Hence, the fundamental question may be articulated as a question 
of whether the essential nature of international arbitration is contractual36, whereby its 
legitimacy stems from the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the will of the parties; or 
jurisdictional37, whereby its fundamental legitimacy can be traced back to the jurisdiction of 
a national legal system on which the arbitration is based; or in fact autonomous38, whereby 
arbitration is conceived as a denationalized and transnational regime that is defined by 
commercial and arbitral custom and the purpose of arbitration: serving commercial 
interests.39 
                                                 
32 Aarnio 1978, p. 93. 
33 According to Aarnio, the existing legal order may be conceived as a system of norms, the basic system, that 
is reformulated  (reorganized) by means of legal dogmatics into another system that has the same normative 
consequences as the first system but that is typically  less extensive and more general. The systematization of 
legal order can be conceived as this reformulation of norms. See Aarnio 1977, p. 272. 
34 Aarnio 1978, p. 83. 
35 Aarnio 1977, p. 272 and Timonen 1998, p. 13. 
36 According to a purely contractualist conception, the parties have the power to stipulate all aspects of their 
procedure since arbitration is a contractual mechanism and not a judiciary, and thus the arbitrator must always 
act in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
37 For a proponent and early theorist of a pure form of jurisdictional theory see Mann 1967. 
38 See i.a. Goldman 1963 or Lalive 1987 on commentators favoring the autonomous approach. As Lew et al. 
described the theory: "The autonomous theory looks to arbitration per se, what it does, what it aims to do, how 
and why it functions in the way it does. It recognises that the relevant laws have developed to help to facilitate 
the smooth working of arbitration." (Lew et al, 2003, p.81). According to the autonomous conception 
arbitration is an autonomous, denationalized and transnational regime that is defined by commercial and 
arbitral custom and the purpose of arbitration: serving commercial interests. The autonomous conception has 
been described as standing in the opposite extreme of the jurisdictional theory (Maniruzzaman 1998, p. 71) 
since under the conception arbitration is transnational and transcends national jurisdictions so that national 
jurisdictions should be given only limited weight. 
39 Today, most writers seem to advocate for a hybrid solution that combines elements from contractual and 
jurisdictional theories. Even under these hybrid regimes, however, the relative weight of jurisdictional and 
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Numerous fundamental questions of international arbitration can equally validly be 
answered in opposing ways, depending on the value one gives to the contractualist, 
jurisdictionalist and autonomous arguments and their underlying morals, and how one 
consequently systematizes the notions of international arbitration. For example, one could 
ask whether mandatory rules of lex arbitri have a special position in relation to other rules 
foreign to lex causae40; or whether national judiciaries are allowed to enforce their national 
public policies in ex post judicial proceedings over the award41; or whether the arbitrator is 
allowed to truly apply foreign mandatory rules,42 and have different outcomes based on the 
values one puts on each conception of arbitration. Indeed, despite some attempts to analyze, 
coordinate and reconcile the differing interpretations of the nature of arbitration,43 the fact 
remains that none of the conceptions has gained a significant and universal predominance 
over others, neither in practice nor in academia.44 The answers to the research questions of 
this study are equally dependent on the answer one gives to the question regarding 
arbitration's nature and how one structures the fundamental question of nature of arbitration; 
if one emphasizes the contractualist and autonomous theories and their arguments, one 
would be more tempted to conclude that arbitrators should not interfere with the applicable 
law chosen by the parties, with or without its trade sanctions, whereas emphasizing the 
                                                 
contractual arguments is for each author to decide. The autonomous theory is one of these hybrid theories. 
(Lew et al. 2003, p. 82). The autonomous conception has been described as standing in the opposite extreme 
of the jurisdictional theory (Maniruzzaman 1998, p. 71) since under the conception arbitration is transnational 
and transcends national jurisdictions so that national jurisdictions should be given only limited weight.  
40 Jurisdictionalists would assert that since the system's jurisdiction stems from the seat's legal order, the rules 
of the seat should be given preference over other mandatory rules, just as in national courts. Contractualists 
and supporters of the autonomous theory would be hesitant of such idea, since the law of the seat have little if 
any contact with the parties and their contract. On the matter of seat's rules in arbitral tribunals, see chapter 
4.5.3 below. 
41 The proponents of the autonomous and contractual theory would stand against such application: as arbitration 
is a creation of international commerce/ the parties' will, it would be wrong for national judiciaries to intervene 
with their autonomy. Jurisdictionalists would hold the opposite view. On the national judiciaries' power to 
interfere with the award, see chapter 3 below. 
42 The contractual approach would be to assert that arbitrator should not deviate from the parties' will even if 
certain public interests were at stake. The supporters of the autonomous approach, on the other hand, would 
contend that transnational notions of public policy should suffice to secure public interests (see the chapter 4.3 
on transnational public policies below). Further, jurisdictionalists would emphasize the significance of the 
public policy control at the stage of arbitration and the duty of the arbitrators to consider national interests of 
connected states (see chapter 4.5 below). 
43 See for example Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp. 224–243 who suggest that a hybrid regime under which 
the legitimacy stems from both contractual and jurisdictional sources should be preferred and a number of 
factors should be considered when assessing public policy issues. As concluded by Barraclough and 
Waincymer, even such hybrid regime nonetheless leaves the arbitrator with a wide discretion in applying the 
public policy rules. 
44 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 244 and Maniruzzaman 1998, p. 66. 
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jurisdictional arguments would more probably lead to applying trade sanctions in foreign 
laws or disregarding certain sanctions of the otherwise applicable law, since as judiciaries, 
arbitrators are obligated to respect certain minimum legal and moral standards. This study 
attempts to systematize and present the different solutions, based on different premises, and 
apply these ideas to the field of trade sanctions.  
As regards the first research question, the task of systematization plays a more limited, yet 
nonetheless significant task. The scope of binding legislation in the field of setting aside and 
enforcement is too very limited, yet broader than in relation to choice of law matters in 
arbitral tribunals. Therefore, the task of systemizing may be employed to a lesser extent than 
in relation to the second research question. However, the basic dilemma of international 
arbitration has also an effect in determining whether the award should be set aside or refused 
enforcement: the determination whether the judge too should respect the parties' will or 
alternatively impose some mandatory legislation in disregard thereof to protect the interests 
in its lex fori will depend on the answer given on the question of the nature of international 
arbitration. Emphasizing contractual values would imply the permanence of arbitral awards 
whereas jurisdictional arguments would stand supportive of protection of national interests. 
National legislation does, however, limit the judge’s ability to freely position himself on this 
continuum. 
Following the adopted systematization, the legal rules concerning both research questions 
must also be interpreted against the framework of the given legal system. Given the light 
mode of regulation employed by national and supranational regulators, semantic 
argumentation will have only secondary importance in this study, and other types of 
argumentation, such as teleological and value-based arguments are used to prove the 
proposed solutions.45 Indeed, given the close relation between questions of public policy and 
the notions of morality and fundamental values, value based argumentation will be given 
relatively much weight. 
                                                 
45 On the types of arguments deployed for interpretation purposes, see Hirvonen 2011, pp. 38–40. 
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Finally, certain remarks regarding sources of law merit attention. As emphasized above, the 
research questions asked are regulated in binding sources of law only to a limited extent. 46 
Since international arbitration may in this manner be conceived, to a large extent, as 
autonomous of nation states, it is therefore only natural that less binding sources of law, such 
as published arbitral awards, international recommendations and conventions, as well as the 
extensive international literature on arbitration will be given more weight than in many other 
fields of law. Also, given that a large share of arbitrations happen under some institutional 
arbitration rules, these rules are used to uncover the widely held practices in arbitration.   
Furthermore, Finnish law and jurisprudence provide only a limited offset for unveiling the 
problematics of recognizing and enforcing arbitral awards, i.e. the first research question. 
Hence, even for these purposes, international jurisprudence and case law will have to be 
employed with the intention of providing the backdrop against which Finnish legislation is 
interpreted. Indeed, since the Finnish arbitration law is largely based on international 
harmonization measures 47  and implements the New York Convention 48  diligently 49 , 
international comparisons will provide essential for the purposes of this study. It is a specific 
feature of international arbitration that foreign court decisions may be relied upon even in 
interpreting the national law of arbitration in purely domestic situations. 50  Given the 
similarities between the Finnish and Swedish judicial systems and arbitration law, and the 
notable positions Sweden and Stockholm hold in the universe of international arbitration, 
special emphasis in this respect will be given to the Swedish legislation, literature and 
precedents. Also the case law of other major places of arbitration such as Switzerland and 
England will be looked into. The relatively numerous references to the US court praxis are 
on the other hand a direct consequence of the active sanctions policy the US has been 
practicing. The comparative method and understanding the state of law in these countries is, 
however, not an end in itself but rather only a tool for the legal dogmatic means. 
                                                 
46 On the classification between binding (strongly and weakly) and permitted sources of law, see Hirvonen 
2011, p. 43. 
47 Even though the FAA is not directly based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, it to a large extent inspired by it 
and in this way follows the international harmonization tendencies. See Taivalkoski 1997, p. 133. 
48 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards adopted in New York on 10 
June 1958 (the “New York Convention”). 
49 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 9. 
50 Heuman 1999, p. 43. See also, Koulu 2007, p. 62. 
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Besides international comparisons, reference may also be sought from the realms of private 
international law51 and international procedural law.52 Sources of international procedural 
law – case law and literature relating to the refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments – could be used as a tool when assessing the public policy exception under Finnish 
arbitration law.53 Arbitration's roots in procedural law and the similarity of the concepts used 
in arbitration and in international procedural law provide attractive reasons for analogous 
application of certain sources of international procedural law, most notably the Brussels I 
Regulation54, and the case law relating thereto.55  
Far-reaching conclusions based on international procedural law instruments should 
nonetheless be avoided since this type of regulation is generally explicitly inapplicable to 
arbitration proceedings and subordinate to arbitration-specific instruments such as the New 
York Convention.56 Enforcement of judicial decisions is based on the principle of mutual 
trust between member states, whereas no such principle exists in relation to arbitrators that 
are not member state judiciaries. This alone means that the systems are not identical.57 
Additionally, Finnish as well as EU practice in relation to recognition of foreign judgments 
is almost as sparse as it is for recognition of foreign awards, and hence instruments of 
international procedural law and private international law offer only a limited set of tools for 
outlining and answering the issues of public policy in international arbitration.58  
                                                 
51 Most notably, see the analoguous application of certain private international law instruments in chapter 4.5.4 
below. 
52 Koulu 2007, pp. 247–253. 
53 Koulu 2007, p. 249. 
54 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast). 
55 See the discussion in chapter 3.5.1 below and Koulu 2007, pp. 54–55. 
56 See i.a. Brussels I Regulation, preamble 12. 
57 Klami – Kuisma 2000, p. 269 and Landolt 2006, p. 202, footnote 108 rightly emphasizing that in case of 
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments, the court delivering the judgment and the one enforcing have an 
equal responsibility to respect the mandatory rules whereas in the case of arbitration, the tribunals are not under 
a legal responsibility to ensure the proper application of mandatory EU law. See also the 1982 Case C-102/81 
(Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei GmbH v Reederei Mond Hochseefischerei Nordstern AG & Co KG) 
where the CJEU concluded that an arbitral body is not a court or tribunal of a Member State as defined in 
Article 267 TFEU (ex Article 234). 
58 For example the Finnish Supreme Court has examined the notion of public policy in relation to recognition 
of foreign judgments in only 3 rulings, KKO 2013:80, KKO 2002:34 and KKO 2014:99, the first two of which 
concern judgments by default and the last one the interpretation of the EU Insolvency Regulation (European 
Community Regulation 1346/2000) and none of which discuss the contents of the principle in extenso.  
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2 Trade sanctions  
 Definitions 
The subject of this study, trade sanctions, has been defined as "government initiated ban[s] 
on trade with another state for reasons pertaining to foreign relations and in reaction [to]  
illegal or politically undesirable acts of that state"59 or more generally as "measures that 
aim to prevent the flow of commodities or products to or from a target".60 Trade sanctions 
thus include both import and export prohibitions that are imposed by one state over another. 
For the purposes of this study, trade sanctions will also include retaliatory measures, i.e. 
counter-sanctions that are implemented by the targeted state in order to respond the original 
trade related measures.61 
Together with financial sanctions, involving the hindrance of the flow of financial or 
economic resources as well as measures such as asset freezes or interruptions of commercial 
or official finance62 , trade sanctions form a category of economic sanctions: "coercive 
economic measures taken against one or more countries to attempt to force a change in 
policies, or at least to demonstrate the sanctioning country's opinion of another's policies".63 
All such economic sanctions are geared to exercise economic pressure on another actor and 
typically intended to produce a political change in their behavior.64 Financial sanctions will 
not be at the center of this study and are as a general rule not discussed.  
In addition to economic sanctions (i.e. trade sanctions and financial sanctions), also other 
types of political measures such as diplomatic sanctions, travel sanctions, and measures 
affecting international transport of goods may be implemented by a state in order to achieve 
                                                 
59 Bohr 1993, p. 256. 
60  Farrall 2007, p. 107. In the same context, Farrall also notes that the term embargo is often used 
interchangeably with the term trade sanction, in including both import and export prohibitions, but sometimes 
also as to referring only to export prohibitions. In this study, the embargo is nonetheless used interchangeably 
with the term trade sanction and referring to both export and import prohibition. A number of writers, i.a. Bohr 
1993, pp. 256–258, Burdeau 2003, pp. 753–776 and Lowenfeld 2002, p. 733 use similar terminology.  
61  E.g. Lowenfeld has in the context of international law defined that such countermeasures would not 
constitute economic sanctions. See Lowenfeld 2002, p. 698. From a private international law perspective, 
however, the question whether a sanction is a primary sanction or retaliatory measure, is of little importance. 
62 Farrall 2007, p. 107. 
63 Carter 1987, p. 1166. 
64 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 15; Farrall 2007, p. 106 and Portela 2010, p. 21. 
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the desired political or other goal.65 Needless to say, all such other sanctions fall outside the 
scope of this study, as this study discusses only trade sanctions.  
Trade sanctions may be implemented in countless different forms. Indeed, no trade sanctions 
regime is alike, and the implemented tools for economic coercion may vary substantially 
between different sanctions programs.66 Trade sanctions may be either comprehensive where 
all flow of commodities and products from and to the sanctioned state is prohibited, or 
particular, where the trade restrictions affect only certain categories of commodities and 
products and their imports or exports.67 Most trade sanctions by the UN and the EU are 
generally very limited in the sense that they limit only the trade of limited categories of 
products and goods, such as arms or nuclear related products. Therefore, also the legal effects 
of the sanctions and their influence on the choice of law may vary between different 
sanctions regimes. Sanctions may also have different effects rationae temporis; some are in 
force indefinitely as long as the wished political goal has been achieved (or deemed 
unnecessary), whereas others are put in place for a limited time. In relation to given parties’ 
contractual relations, trade sanctions may be either subsequent (the parties’ contract was 
already in force at the time of the imposition of the sanction) or antedecent (the parties 
concluded their contract at a point in time when the sanction was already in force).  
Most often, besides merely prohibiting the export or import of certain products or goods, the 
sanctions also prohibit the satisfaction of all claims, often including claims for recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards, in connection with the prohibitions set out in the 
sanction.68  
Most trade sanctions claim to have extraterritorial effects in the sense that they strive not 
only to apply to transactions within the territory of the promulgating state (non-
                                                 
65 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 14–15. The totality of all such sanctions, including economic sanctions, is in 
EU law referred to as restrictive measures. See i.a. Article 215 TFEU and the Regulations laid down on its 
authority as well as the Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04. 
66 Farrall 2010, p. 107. 
67 Farrall 2010, pp. 110–111. 
68 See i.a. Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014, on the prohibition of imports originating 
from Crimea or Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 on prohibiting trade of nuclear 
technologies with Iran. See however also Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 on the sectoral 
sanctions on i.a. oil related technologies and arms embargo against Russia that prohibits the satisfaction of 
claims but do not expressly state whether i.a. the enforcement of arbitral awards would constitute a claim in 
the sense of that regulation (compare to article 1 of Council Regulation (EU) 692/2014). 
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extraterritorial sanctions) but also based on the nationality or the place of residence of the 
sanction's subjects.69 This links the questions of trade sanctions to the framework of public 
international law and to the questions of states' jurisdiction to prescribe rules that require 
application outside the promulgating state. The question whether the state has jurisdiction to 
prescribe e.g. trade sanctions over the parties may have effect on the question whether 
arbitrator should have the power, or a duty, to apply such rules in the parties dispute, even if 
the law containing the sanction was not the law chosen by the parties.70  
It is generally held that states' may exercise their jurisdiction within their territory 
(territoriality principle) and on the basis of the nationality or the place of residence of the 
persons or entities subject to the jurisdiction (nationality principle) as well as based on the 
protection of the security interests of the promulgating state (protection principle).71 As for 
sanctions that prescribe applicability outside the promulgating state and its citizens, based 
on the effects that certain activities may have within the sanctioning state, their status under 
public international law is largely disputed. 72  Different states may also define their 
jurisdiction to prescribe rules differently; for example the US has defined that its jurisdiction 
based on the nationality principle extends to companies, wherever incorpor.ated or located, 
but owned or controlled by US citizens or residents or by persons effectively present on US 
territory, or by companies incorporated or conducting business in the US. Such definition of 
nationality is much disputed under rules of public international law.73 
For the purposes of this study, extraterritorial trade sanctions shall refer to all sanctions not 
based on the territorial principle, i.e. all sanctions outside the sphere of non-extraterritorial 
                                                 
69 See i.a. EU sanctions regulations that provide for effects based on the territorial and nationality principles, 
i.a. EU sanctions against Russia, Article 13 (Council Regulations 692/2014 and 833/2014), that purport to 
apply to i.a. any person inside or outside the territory of the Union who is a national of a Member State; to 
any legal person, entity or body, inside or outside the territory of the Union, which is incorporated or 
constituted under the law of a Member State or to any legal person, entity or body in respect of any business 
done in whole or in part within the Union. 
70 See chapter 4.5.4 below. 
71 Brownlie 2008, pp. 300–304 and Lowenfeld 2002, pp. 742–746. 
72 Brownlie 2008, pp. 311–315 and Lowenfeld 2002, pp. 741–742. 
73  See Lowenfeld 2002, pp. 740–742 and the referred US Foreign Assets Control Regulations 31.CFR, 
§500.329 where the application of the trade sanction is extended to all foreign companies controlled by US 
entities. See for example District Court at the Hague in Compagnie Europeenne des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor 
Nederland B. V., 17. September 1982 where the Dutch court deemed that the US manner to define the scope 
of its trade sanctions based on the ownership or controlling by US citizens does not meet the requirements of 
international law and the extraterritorial application of US sanctions cannot be based on such definition of the 
nationality principle. The US rules were thus not given effect. 
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trade sanctions.74 The truly extraterritorial trade sanctions are at hand where the sanction's 
scope exceeds that permitted by international law. 
One further concept in relation to trade sanctions that must be mentioned is the notion of 
blocking statutes under which countries attempt to counterbalance and neutralize the impact 
of extraterritorial application of foreign trade sanctions. These measures have been taken 
especially in relation to the US's unilateral and truly extraterritorial trade sanctions against 
third states. The EU has i.a. adopted such blocking statutes to counter certain US sanctions 
against Iran, Libya and Cuba.75 Under these statutes it is illegal for EU entities to comply 
with US trade sanctions and equally illegal to recognize or enforce judgments or awards that 
have given such sanctions effect.76 These blocking statutes, in essence, constitute an obstacle 
over any assessment of the legitimacy of the foreign trade sanctions by national judiciaries 
or arbitrators resolving the dispute, since the assessment is already made by the legislator of 
the promulgating state.77 They may also pose a tricky situation where an arbitrator or a judge 
could be faced with a conflict between a blocking statute on the one hand and the trade 
sanction the blocking statute attempts to neutralize on the other. 
 Multilateral and unilateral trade sanctions 
Trade sanctions may be either multilateral or unilateral. Multilateral sanctions are adopted 
by the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) and may be mandatory in the sense that 
UN can require states' compliance with them.78 Unilateral trade sanctions79 on the other hand 
are autonomously imposed by an individual state, group of states or by a supranational entity 
such as the EU with no direct connection to a UNSC decision. As will be noted below, the 
distinction between multilateral and unilateral sanctions may have a material impact on the 
                                                 
74 Other writers opine that extraterritorial sanctions should refer to only the truly extraterritorial sanctions. 
For this type of definition, see Lowenfeld 2002, p. 741 who discusses the problem of extraterritorial application 
from the viewpoint of the states' jurisdiction and argues that sanctions based on nationality are accepted by the 
international law. See also Marchand 2012, pp. 204–205. 
75 See Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-
territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom. 
76 Articles 4 and 5 Council Regulation 2271/96. 
77 Cortese 2004, p. 745. 
78 Lowenfeld 2002, pp. 702–703. 
79 Unilateral trade sanctions are also sometimes referred to as national trade sancitions (Lowenfeld 2002, p. 
731) or autonomous sanctions (Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 12). 
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applicability of the trade sanction in a dispute before an arbitral tribunal or in national setting 
aside or enforcement proceedings. 
The UN's power to adopt multilateral trade sanctions is based on Articles 39 and 41 of the 
United Nations Charter (“UNC”). Article 39 provides that: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security." 
Further, Article 41 UNC maintains that: 
"The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations." 
Decisions of the UNSC under the above provisions do not, however, have mandatory effect 
on private individuals, but they are rather directed at, and impose on the member states of 
the UN a duty to implement the sanctions in their national legislation.80 It is thus mainly the 
responsibility of the member states of the UN to implement the sanctions into their 
legislation and the means by which the UNSC resolutions are implemented may vary from 
one state to another.81 Typically the national legislation implementing the UNSC sanctions 
is also more specific than the resolutions they reflect.82 UN sanctions are economic and 
political tools the wordings of which do not normally refer to specific types of legal 
relationships but are in this manner rather vague.83 In EU member states, UNSC Resolutions 
are implemented by means of the EU's CFSP and decisions and regulations of the Council 
of the European Union (“Council”). As will be described below, multilateral sanctions may 
                                                 
80 See Article 25 UNC. 
81 Lowenfeld 2002, p. 704. 
82 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 12. 
83 Burdeau 2001, pp. 272–273. 
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in certain cases nonetheless have an effect on the relationship between contractual parties, 
despite not having been duly implemented into the applicable legislation.84 
Article 39 UNC also reserves the right for the UNSC to issue non-binding recommendations. 
These recommendations impose no obligation to follow the sanctions (i.e. no penalty follows 
from non-compliance) but on the other hand they guarantee that a state acting in accordance 
with such sanctions cannot be held responsible for the measures taken under the 
recommendation. 85  The United Nations General Assembly may also issue non-binding 
recommendations for countries to take action to impose trade sanctions.86 
Unilateral trade sanctions are sanctions that are not based on binding UNSC resolutions and 
that are decided unilaterally by a state or by a supranational entity such as the EU. They may 
be either completely autonomous, or spontaneous, in the sense that they are imposed with 
no connection to any UNSC sanction, or they may alternatively impose additional or more 
extensive sanctions than those prescribed for in the relevant UNSC resolution.87  
Some sanctions, especially multilateral sanctions or those taken following a UNSC 
resolution but taking more extensive measures, can be conceived as being taken for non-
selfish goals, such as maintaining peace and international cooperation. Sometimes, however, 
unilateral sanctions may be used as a means of imposing essentially selfish interests. In this 
way, unilateral sanctions have sometimes been referred to as political rules in the sense that 
they are closely connected to certain economic, social and political legislative interests of 
one state and aim to promote purely its own public or economic interests.88 It may prove 
difficult to draw a line between orthodox sanctions and the cases where the illicit limitations 
to free trade are merely disguised as trade sanction.89  
                                                 
84 See chapter 4.3 below. 
85 Lowenfeld 2002, p. 720. 
86 See i.a. UNGA Resolution A/RES/42/23 and UNGA Resolution A/RES/41/35 condemning the apartheid 
regime of South Africa and urging all states to impose economic sanctions against it. 
87 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 12. 
88 See i.a. Moitry 1991, p. 361 and the example of India–Pakistan hostilities in Voser 1996, p. 353 and the 
referred ICC Award 1512. 
89 On this distinction see the application-worthiness test described above in chapters 4.3.2 and 4.5.4 below. 
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 Trade sanctions under Finnish law 
In practice all sanctions programs applied in Finland become applicable through the EU and 
its CFSP. EU sanctions regimes are implemented by means of Council Decisions and 
Regulations and may include sanctions unilaterally adopted by the EU, as well as multilateral 
trade sanctions originally issued by the UNSC. For the time being, as an EU member state, 
Finland has adopted trade sanctions such as export or import prohibitions against 25 different 
states 90  as well as certain restrictive measures against given individuals affiliated with 
terrorist activities. In all cases the measures are based on decisions and regulations issued by 
the Council. As regards of 6 out of the 25 states, the sanctions are imposed solely pursuant 
to the EU’s autonomous CFSP powers without any UN involvement.91 In the remaining 19 
cases, the UNSC has also imposed at least some economic sanctions against the state 
sanctioned by the EU. In many cases, however, the EU has imposed further and more 
extensive autonomous sanctions not covered by UN Sanctions resolutions.92 
The EU trade sanctions typically relate to trade of arms, other military equipment or dual-
use technologies. In some cases, however, broader categories of products and services are 
affected. For example the current sanctions regimes against Syria, North Korea, and Russia 
include also other categories of goods and products.93 
Besides EU sanctions, Section 1 Sanctions Act reserves Finland the theoretical possibility to 
implement UN sanctions autonomously of the EU. If the EU would be unable to adopt a 
sanctions regulation, or in the unlikely scenario where it would be deemed that the sanction 
as adopted by the EU was not comprehensive enough, the Finnish government is reserved 
                                                 
90 These countries in alphabetical order are: Afghanistan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African 
Republic, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, 
Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, North Korea, Russia, Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, and Zimbabwe. 
Besides this, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Finland lists six additional states or individuals in these states 
against whom other types of sanctions, such as financial sanctions (most notably asset freezes) or travel bans 
are imposed. These states are: Guinea–Bissau, Moldavia, Republic of Guinea, Tunisia, Ukraine and Yemen 
(http://formin.finland.fi/pakotteet, accessed 20 August 2015). 
91  These six states are: Belarus, China, Myanmar, Russia, Syria and Zimbabwe 
(http://formin.finland.fi/pakotteet, accessed 20 August 2015). 
92 See i.a. the EU sanctions against North Korea and the Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1062 that 
extends freezing of funds to certain individuals and entities not covered by any UNSC Sanction. 
93 See i.a.  Council Regulation (EU) No 36/2012, prohibiting oil imports from Syria; Council Regulation (EC) 
No 329/2007, prohibiting exports of certain luxury goods to North Korea and Council Regulation (EU) No 
692/2014 prohibiting the import of any products originating from Crimea/Sevastopol. 
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with the possibility to implement UN sanctions autonomously.94 However, so far all UN 
sanctions have been adopted through EU regulations, and a recent Government Bill for the 
amendment of the Sanctions Act explicitly prescribes that autonomous sanctions outside the 
EU framework are no longer imposed.95 Certain limited categories of trade restrictions, for 
example certain arms embargoes, may however have to be implemented nationally since 
they are based on Council decisions that do not bind member states as such.96 Even in these 
limited cases, the national piece of legislation would contain a simple reference to the 
relevant Council Decision. In every case, virtually all major trade sanctions are enforced 
through Council Regulations. Autonomous Finnish sanctions are mostly a theoretical option, 
and are hence not discussed in extenso in this study. 
Finally, under Finnish law, breaches of trade sanctions are criminally sanctioned as 
regulation offences. Regulation offences are incriminated under Chapter 46 Sections 1–3 
Criminal Code (39/1889). Depending on the gravity of the offence, the penalty for regulation 
offences may range from a fine to four years in prison.  
 Trade sanctions and arbitrability 
This study discusses trade sanctions and their relation to the public policy exception as it is 
known in international arbitration law. However, since issues of public policy and 
arbitrability are so closely entwined with each other97 and since limited arbitrability may 
have effect on the application of trade sanctions as public policy rules, some quick remarks 
regarding the arbitrability of trade sanction issues merit attention.98 
As a general rule, the mandatory or public law nature of a provision of law, be it trade 
sanction or any other rule of mandatory law, does not as such prevent the arbitrability of 
these matters. 99  After the mid-20th century, the scope of arbitrability has constantly 
expanded, making it ever more probable that also matters of trade sanctions may be subjected 
                                                 
94 Björklund 2002, p. 64. 
95 HE 288/2014 vp, p. 4 and 17. 
96 HE 288/2014 vp, p. 17. 
97 The notion of arbitrability is commonly said to be included in the common concept of public policy.  See i.a. 
HE 202/1991 vp, p. 30; SOU 1994:81, p. 173; prop. 1998/99:35, p. 142 and Born 2014, pp. 2700––2701. 
98 For a more comprehensive reviews of trade sanctions and arbitrability, see Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 
85–98; Burdeau 2003, pp. 758–762 and Cortese 2004, pp. 737–739. 
99 Heuman 1999, p. 156. 
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to arbitration.100 This tendency is reflected in the modern international arbitral as well as 
judicial practice that has almost unanimously considered matters of trade sanctions 
arbitrable101 This is equally true for issues pertaining to multilateral102 as well as unilateral103 
trade sanctions. 
Finnish arbitration law too is built on a broad notion of arbitrability. The general tendency 
to allow arbitration in matters relating to mandatory public law is predominant in Finland.104 
The travaux préparatoires of the SAA, a close corollary of Finnish arbitration law, explicitly 
state that foreign economic and political regulations are not likely to affect the arbitrability 
of a dispute.105 No directly applicable Finnish case law seems to exist as to the arbitrability 
of trade sanctions but considering the international case law relating to the matter and the 
general pro-arbitration tendencies in Finland, it would seem very likely that arbitrators would 
be allowed to consider trade sanction matters in Finland. 
                                                 
100 Burdeau 2003, pp. 758–759. 
101 See i.a. ICC Award 6719 and the Swiss Federal Tribunal decision ruling BGE 118 II 353 relating thereto. 
See however the Court of Appeal of Genoa in in the highly criticized Fincantieri (Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali 
Italiani SPA (Italy) v. Ministry of Defense of Iraq) ruling, relating to the same dispute as the ICC award 6719 
and the Swiss Federal Tribunal decision. The Genoan court concluded that arbitration disputes relating to UN 
sanctions were not arbitrable and assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. The Italian view has been heavily 
criticized by writers (see i.a. Azeredo da Silveira p. 94–95 and Burdeau 2003, pp. 758–762) as well as 
judiciaries of other countries (see Cour d'appel de Paris 05/05404, refusing to enforce the Italian judgment in 
the dispute, asserting that the dispute was arbitrable and hence concluding that Italian courts did not have the 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute) and should thus not be followed. 
102 Matray 1997, pp. 74–76; ICC Award n. 6719 and Quebec Court of Appeal 2003 CanLII 35834. 
103 Matray 1997, pp. 92–93. 
104 Ovaska 2007, p. 37 and Taivalkoski 1997, p. 142. See also the Helsinki Court of Appeal ruling HelHO S 
01/1007, 22 August 2009, n:o 2419, where the Court of Appeal deemed matters relating to competition law 
arbitrable. 
105 SOU 1994:81 p. 79. 
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3 Public policies and trade sanctions in Finnish setting 
aside and recognition proceedings 
 Introduction 
The following chapter discusses the fundamentals of Finnish legislation relating to setting 
aside as well as recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. In particular, the following 
chapter will concentrate on the public policy exceptions that may allow the taking of certain 
trade sanctions into consideration, or alternatively, allow disregarding a sanction that could 
be conceived to contravene with the concept of public policy as it is understood in Finland. 
It should again be emphasized that in Finland, as in most other developed jurisdictions, 
arbitral awards are final in the sense that no appeal to national courts is available to alter the 
material outcome of the award. 106  However, the public policy exception provides a 
possibility, albeit a limited one, to intervene with an arbitral award if the award would result 
in an outcome that would be against certain fundamental economic, legal, moral, political, 
religious or social standards (public policies) that the state wishes to protect. The following 
subchapters thus discuss under what conditions trade sanctions may or may not be 
considered as public policies which would permit the courts at the place of arbitration or 
enforcement intervene with the award. 
This third chapter will start by looking into the very nature of the public policy exception. 
This is done through the examination of certain international interpretative guidelines in 
relation to the public policy exception, categorizing the different types of cases where 
material public policies may have effect in recognition and enforcement proceedings.107 This 
categorization will then enable the understanding of the public policy exception and its 
nature in a Finnish context. The notion of Finnish public policy in arbitration related judicial 
proceedings is first discussed on a more general level, without taking a specific stand on 
trade sanctions. First, the procedural framework for applying principles of public policy in 
setting aside and recognition and enforcement proceedings is discussed.108 The following 
subchapter then briefly looks into the material scope of autonomous Finnish public policy.109 
                                                 
106 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 8. 
107 Chapter 3.2. 
108 Chapter 3.3.1. 
109 Chapter 3.3.2. 
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The possibility to apply trade sanctions as Finnish, autonomous public policies is then 
discussed in chapter 3.4. The notion of EU public policy, essential in relation to trade 
sanctions implemented through an EU framework, is discussed in the final subchapters of 
this third chapter.110 The final subchapter on EU public policy contains the most notable 
findings as regards the first research question.  
 Categories of public policy 
In order to grasp the notion of public policies in international arbitration, and in order to 
enable their interpretation in the relative absence of national coercive legislation and 
guidelines for interpretation, international guidelines may be resorted to. The national 
framework in relation to the refusal of recognition and enforcement is in most countries 
based on the 1958 New York Convention and its article V which exhaustively sets out the 
grounds based on which the enforcement and recognition of a foreign award may be refused. 
The Convention's article V(2)(b) sets out the public policy exception: 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought 
finds that:  
[…] 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country. 
This provision may be considered the basis on which most national conceptions of public 
policy in international arbitration are based. Hence, given the international nature of the 
arbitration laws and their enforcement provisions, international considerations should thus 
be given particular weight when interpreting them.111 The New York Convention does not, 
however, provide much help in interpreting the provision. 
                                                 
110 Chapters 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
111 Koulu 2007, pp. 250–251 and Kurkela–Uoti 1995, p. 51. 
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For this purpose, an international set of recommendations such as the ILA 
Recommendations 112  may prove useful in constructing a general framework of public 
policies in international arbitration, i.e. to systematize the field, and to understand the 
different forms in which public policies may have effect on the parties' dispute. The 
Recommendations are hence not used here to assist the interpretation of the public policy 
exception but mainly only to systematize the relevant field and to understand the different 
forms of the same phenomenon. The adopted general framework may then in the following 
be used to consider issues of public policy in a Finnish perspective.113 
The ILA Recommendations and their explanatory notes, the Interim and the Final Reports 
purport to facilitate the consistency and predictability in the interpretation and application of 
public policy exception in the New York Convention. 114  Although the ILA 
Recommendations have no imperative value as such, they have often been regarded as 
forming a notable corpus of interpretative guidelines that reflects somewhat of a consensus 
among practitioners and represent the opinions of some of the most notable international 
scholars hailing from different backgrounds. 115  As the full name of the ILA 
Recommendations, the International Law Association's Recommendations on the 
Application of Public Policy as a Ground for Refusing Recognition or Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Award, suggests, the Recommendations only apply to the notion of 
public policy as it is applied in national courts in relation to recognition and enforcement 
proceedings. As will be shown below, they may also be used to understand and classify 
public policies and mandatory rules as they are applied in setting aside proceedings, or even 
in arbitral tribunals.  
The Recommendations have defined the public policy as consisting of three constituent 
elements: 
                                                 
112 International Law Association's Recommendations on the Application of Public Policy as a Ground for 
Refusing Recognition or Enforcement of International Arbitral Award. 
113 See chapters 3.3.2–3.4.2 below. 
114 ILA Recommendations p. 1. 
115 See i.a. Koulu 2007, p. 68 and 250 and Svea Court of Appeal, 2 July 2012, Case No. T 611-11 where the 
Svea Court of Appeal based its judgment in setting aside proceedings on the ILA Recommendations. The 
positions adopted in ILA Recommendations do not, however, represent a unanimous opinion of practitioners 
worldwide. Instead, as will be discussed below in this chapter, a number of authors disagree with the position 
with regard to lois de police, adopted in the ILA Recommendations, according to which public policy rules or 
lois de police should be discussed through the public policy mechanism. 
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1. Fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to 
protect even when it is not directly concerned; 
2. Rules designed to serve the essential political, social or economic interests of the 
State, these being known as “lois de police” or “public policy rules”; and 
3. The duty of the State to respect its obligations towards other States or international 
organisations.116  
Although the boundaries between the above categories are not at all strict and rule may fall 
into more than one category, they may provide useful guidance when assessing certain public 
policy rules such as trade sanctions.117 For example, and as elaborated more detail below, a 
trade sanction could in different situations be classified as either a public policy rule or an 
international obligation by a state. How the sanction is classified may also have some 
practical consequences on its application. 
The first category, fundamental principles pertaining to justice or morality, is said to cover 
principles of good faith, pacta sunt servanda and prohibitions of abuse of rights, 
discrimination and activities that are contra bonos mores such as piracy, terrorism, genocide, 
slavery and drug trafficking.118  
With regard to trade sanctions, the category of fundamental principles should in most cases 
not become applicable. It is possible, however, to consider certain foreign trade sanctions at 
the stage of enforcement to be against some national fundamental principles so that the 
enforcement judiciaries would be unable to give the foreign provisions effect. This could be 
the case where a sanction in the applicable law would be obviously discriminatory. Even in 
these cases, the category of fundamental principles would have effect through the two other 
categories.119 It is also imaginable that the enforcement court would hold itself bound to 
apply the sanctions of certain countries so as not to breach some fundamental principles of 
their own law. For example in Regazzoni120, an English court gave effect to an Indian export 
prohibition, outside the applicable English law, on the basis that it would be against the 
                                                 
116 ILA Recommendation 2002, p. 1.  
117 See ILA Recommendation 2002 p. 1. 
118 ILA Final Report pp. 6–7. 
119 Fundamental principle arguments could be fed by resorting to mandatory rules of law or by resorting to 
international obligations such as human rights conventions. 
120 See the court ruling in Regazzoni v. K. C. Sethia [1958] AC 301. 
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principles of British public policy render a judgment that would be contrary to the laws of a 
friendly state, and potentially to promote racial discrimination policies of the South Africa. 
As will be discussed below, this latter type of comity argumentation, typical to the English 
judiciaries, should not however as a general rule be extended to apply to setting aside as well 
as recognition and enforcement proceedings in Finland.121 
The second category, "lois de police" or "public policy rules", i.e. mandatory rules122, form 
the most notable part of so called positive public policy, i.e. rules that must be applied 
irrespective of the parties' choice of law. According to Mayer: "[A] mandatory rule…is an 
imperative provision of law which must be applied to an international relationship 
irrespective of the law that governs that relationship". In this sense, mandatory rules of law 
always perform a positive function; they are applied besides or instead of otherwise 
applicable law.123  
There has, however, been discussion as to whether all of the mandatory rules of a given state 
form a part of that state’s public policy. It could rightly be argued that there are some rules 
of law that could be classified by courts of law or international arbitrators as having a 
mandatory effect, even if they did not form a part of the state’s public policy, i.e. fundamental 
values and standards of that country.124 It may also be asked whether trade sanctions, at least 
directly, protect the most fundamental values of a nation. Conceived this way, only the 
fundamental principles themselves are protected, not the given mandatory rules of each state 
in themselves. Trade sanctions are most often indeed mere political tools, geared to induce 
pressure to achieve fundamentally selfish political goals. Nevertheless, drawing a distinction 
between merely political measures and those pertaining to "true" public policy does not seem 
fruitful for the purposes of national judiciaries, as the these courts employing the public 
policy exception will generally only look to their own legislation, and only exceptionally 
should they consider that their own legislation would be against some fundamental principles 
                                                 
121 See chapter 3.4.2 below. 
122Also known as lois d'application immediate (laws of immediate application). Mandatory rules of law, lois 
d'application immediate and lois de police have usually been perceived as synonymous concepts. The term lois 
d'application immédiate does, however, emphasize the mechanism of application of rule, whereas the term lois 
de police stresses its function. Regarding terminology, see Guedj 1991 pp. 665–670. 
123 Lalive 1987, pp. 263–264. 
124 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 56–57.  
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law.125 Hence, all rules that are so mandatory that they warrant application in international 
arbitration, even if in contradiction with the otherwise applicable law, are for the purposes 
of this study considered public policy. 
Some writers have, in relation to choice of law issues in arbitration, also strongly emphasized 
the strictly negative function of public policy and the juxtaposition of public policy and 
mandatory rules, stating e.g. that: "public policy […] has a defensive function (that of a 
shield) unlike mandatory rules which have an attacking / aggressive function (that of a 
sword)"126 . Following this conception, public policy would only refer to the first (and 
potentially the third) category under ILA Recommendations, the fundamental principles (and 
perhaps states’ international obligations). Since, the travaux préparatoires of the Finnish 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) clearly suggest that Finnish public policy also includes the positive 
facet of the notion127, and this study discusses trade sanctions in both arbitration as well as 
in related judicial proceedings and hence builds its conception of public policies on a uniform 
standard of public policy. Hence, public policy refers to the entirety of all three categories, 
fundamental principles refer to the defensive function and public policy rules, or mandatory 
rules, to the aggressive function. Thus, for the purposes of this study and both of its research 
questions, mandatory rules will be considered as a matter of public policy (ordre public), 
and moreover reflecting a public policy so commanding that they must be applied even if the 
general body of law to which they belong is not competent by application of the relevant rule 
of conflict of laws.128  
The ILA Final Report expressly states that measures of embargo, blockade or boycott serve 
as examples of public policy rules.129 This would seem to imply that according to the ILA 
Recommendations, unilateral sanctions, maybe even foreign ones, could be applied as public 
policy rules in recognition and enforcement proceedings, since the case of multilateral 
                                                 
125 See chapter 3.4.2 below. 
126 Mistelis 2011, p. 292. See also Guedj 1991, p. 680 and for similar perceptions from a Finnish private 
international law perspective, see Klami–Kuisma 2000, pp. 76–80. 
127 See the discussion in chapter 3.3.2 below. 
128 Mayer 1986, p. 275. 
129 ILA Final Report, p. 7. 
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sanctions will be covered through the category of the state's international obligations. 
Whether or not this is true will be discussed in later chapters.130 
The third category of public policy, states' obligations towards other states or international 
organizations, may play a notable role in applying trade sanctions as public policy. They are 
in a way a corollary to the category of lois de police, discussed above, but unlike them, the 
states' obligations towards other states are not based on the national law of a certain state, 
but rather on the collective of states, on UNSC Resolutions or international conventions. 
According to the ILA Recommendations, the archetype of this type of international public 
policy is a UNSC Resolution imposing trade sanctions.131 Therefore it would seem clear that 
according to the ILA Recommendations, a multilateral trade sanction could become 
applicable under the public policy exception. Such international obligation would however 
only become directly applicable if the sanction had not been adopted and ratified by the 
country where refusal of recognition or enforcement is sought. Otherwise the national piece 
of legislation itself could be relied upon. There could be cases, however, where a state or the 
EU had failed to duly implement the UNSC sanction and thus it would be necessary to 
directly apply the international obligation itself.132  
Having concluded this brief inspection on the possible categorization the public policy 
exception and of the manner in which it has been discerned internationally, the next question 
to be discussed is the general manner in which the Finnish procedural legislation allows the 
judge to consider public policy matters. In order to understand the scope of Finnish public 
policy, and to discuss whether trade sanctions fall inside or outside of that scope, it is, 
however, essentially important to understand the procedural framework in which the arbitral 
awards may be set aside or refused recognition and enforcement. Among other things, the 
below discusses whether the standard for public policy for setting aside is the same as for 
refusing recognition and enforcement. 
                                                 
130 See chapters 3.4 and 3.5.2 below. 
131 This is expressly stated in the ILA Final Report p. 7. 
132 On this issue, see chapter 3.4.1 below. 
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 Public policy in Finland 
3.3.1 Framework for setting aside or refusing recognition and 
enforcement in FAA 
The concept of public policy, or ordre public, is in Finnish legislation and jurisprudence 
referred to as "Suomen oikeusjärjestyksen perusteet", literally the "fundamentals of Finnish 
legal order".133 Finnish legal practice or literature do not offer a clear definition for the 
concept.134 It has been noted that the concept is constantly evolving, making a complete list 
of the rules that comprise the Finnish public policy a practical impossibility.135 In Finnish 
arbitration law, the concept of public policy is referred to in Sections 40(1)(2) and 52(2) 
FAA. Section 40(1)(2) discusses the setting aside of an award whereas Section 52(2) 
contains the legal basis for refusal of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. 
The recognition and enforcement provisions in Finnish and Swedish arbitration law, as well 
as in most other national arbitration laws, including the UNCITRAL Model Law, are based 
on the New York Convention.136 
New York Convention Article V(2)(b) has been implemented into Finnish arbitration law 
with Section 52(2) FAA, providing that an arbitral award rendered in a foreign state shall 
not be recognized to the extent that it is contrary to the public policy of Finland. The 
Government Bill to Section 52 FAA includes an explicit reference to the New York 
Convention and states that the FAA must correspond with the convention.137 Virtually no 
relevant national case law138 and very little jurisprudential writings exist regarding the public 
policy exception in setting aside and enforcement proceedings in Finland. The lack of 
                                                 
133 See e.g. Sections 40(1)(2) and 52(2) FAA, discussed in more detail below. The principle of public policy is 
also sometimes referred to as "ehdottomuusperiaate", literally translated the "principle of absoluteness". On 
the terminology, see Esko 1993, pp. 116–117. 
134 Esko 1993, p. 121; Koulu 2007, p. 249 and Kurkela – Uoti 1994, p. 77. For an outline of the notions of 
mandatory rules and public policy within Finnish private international law, see Klami – Kuisma 2000, pp. 76–
86. 
135 Esko 1993, p. 121. 
136 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 30; Prop.1998/99:35, p. 138, UNCITRAL Model Law Explanatory Note, p. 36. 
137 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 30. 
138 The Supreme Court of Finland appears to have explicitly assessed the notion of public policy in only one 
ruling and even there only in passing. In the said case, KKO 1989:24, the Supreme Court discussed the 
enforceability of a Czech award in the light of Czech insolvency law. The Supreme Court concluded that no 
breach of Finnish public policy was at hand in the case. Even here, the Supreme Court itself did not state on 
the public policy matters but rather contended to refer to the ruling by lower courts.  
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Finnish material and the deeply international character of international arbitration and 
especially New York Convention imply that when considering public policy matters under 
the FAA, special weight ought to be given to international and comparative law sources.  
The provision in FAA governing the public policy exception in annulation proceedings, 
Section 40(1)(2) FAA states that an award shall be null and void to the extent that the 
recognition of the award would be contrary to the public policy of Finland. According to the 
Government Bill, an award is contrary to the Finnish public policy and thus null and void 
when it orders a remedy or a solution which is forbidden under Finnish law or when 
arbitrators have failed to follow a mandatory legal norm reflecting the fundamentals of 
Finnish legal order (a public policy norm).139 Further, it is stated that an award is null and 
void only if the award is defect in a gross and essential manner.140 The Government Bill 
provides no further assistance in interpreting the provision. 
Unlike the recognition and enforcement procedure, the setting aside proceedings in Finland 
(or any other state for that matter) is not directly based on any major international convention 
such as the New York Convention but rather is national in character. In both the UNCITRAL 
Model Law as well as in the Finnish and Swedish arbitration laws, the grounds for setting 
aside an award, however, reflect the principles and even the wordings adopted in the New 
York Convention to a great extent.141 Hence, especially with the growing popularity of 
international arbitration and especially with the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law by 
a number of major jurisdictions, the requirements for setting aside an award have in most 
jurisdictions become somewhat uniform and reflect the principles set out in the New York 
Convention.  
Since both national recognition and enforcement as well as setting aside procedures 
essentially reflect the New York Convention, it has been assumed that the basic principles 
governing both types of national legislation would be the same. This is illustrated by the 
                                                 
139 Government Bill 202/1991 vp, p. 30. 
140 Government Bill 202/1991 vp, p. 8. 
141 See i.a. Taivalkoski 1997, p. 178; prop. 1998/99:35, p. 138 and UNCITRAL Model Law Explanatory Note 
p. 35. The Swedish government bill explicitly states in the context of setting aside provisions that the Swedish 
law shall be to a even greater extent be bound to the New York Convention's directions. 
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similar wordings between setting aside and recognition and enforcement provisions142 as 
well as by the existence of the New York Convention Article V(1)(e) under which the 
recognition and enforcement of an award may be refused if it has been set aside by a 
competent authority of the country in which or under the law of which that award was made. 
What must be asked is whether the scope of the public policy exception under the New York 
Convention and under the relevant national setting aside provisions is exactly the same. 
Some jurisdictions seem to have adopted this view143 whereas, most jurisdictions seem to 
recognize that the concept of public policy in setting aside procedure at least parallels the 
conception embodied in the New York Convention. 144  In some jurisdictions, i.a. in 
Switzerland, it has however been explicitly stated that the concept of public policy under the 
national setting aside regime is stricter than under New York Convention enforcement 
regime.145 The Swiss conception of public policy in setting aside proceedings is therefore 
especially strict one (representing standards of attenuated public policy), partially because it 
becomes applicable only in truly international disputes. Unlike Swiss law, however, Finnish 
law does not make a distinction between the public policy applicable in purely domestic 
situations and the one applicable in international cases.146. Given the fundamental difference 
between the enforcement regimes between the countries, it would not be advisable to blindly 
follow the Swiss approach.  
Thus, it could relatively safely be argued that the scope of the public policy exception under 
the FAA setting aside and recognition and enforcement provisions is also substantially the 
same, and when applying one of the provisions, inspiration could be sought from literature 
and case law relating to the other.147 Article V(2)(b) and its embodiment in Section 52(2) 
FAA should serve at least as a general benchmark of public policy for setting aside 
proceedings under Section 40 FAA. As this study only discusses some general guidelines in 
                                                 
142 Compare i.a. the wordings of public policy exceptions in Sections 40(1)(2) and 52(2) FAA or the grounds 
for setting aside in Section 41 and 53 FAA. Similarly, see Articles 34 and 36 UNCITRAL Model Law. 
143 See Born 2014, p. 3318 and the referred Singaporean ruling, based on UNCITRAL Model Law.   
144 Redfern et al. 2009, p. 595 and UNCITRAL Model Law Explanatory Note, p. 36. 
145 Geisinger et al. 2012, p. 429 and Poudret – Besson 2007, p. 770. 
146Taivalkoski 1997, p. 178. 
147See also Koulu 2007, p. 250 and Kurkela–Uoti 1995, p. 51, both stating that international influences should 
have a major influence in interpreting the setting aside provisions under the FAA. 
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relation to trade sanction and public policy matters, the two facets of public policy may as a 
general rule be considered convergent. 
The application of setting aside provisions as well as the contents of the notion of public 
policy in relation thereto do, however, differ from one country to another, despite the 
uniform New York Convention background and some further attempts to unify their 
interpretation between countries.148 In a given individual case, the country of enforcement 
may very well be different from the place of the arbitral proceedings, and the application and 
the substantive public policy may actually be different between the countries, since each 
country would most probably opt to apply their own public policies.149 Also, it is not unheard 
of that a country would grant recognition and enforcement even if the award had been set 
aside due to public policy issues in another country. The fact that New York Convention 
Article V(1)(e) only states that set aside awards may be refused recognition and enforcement 
means that public policies of the seat will de facto become applicable only if the enforcing 
state chooses to give the Article V(1)(e) effect. Although most jurisdictions refuse to enforce 
set aside awards, some states, most notably France, have held that even vacated awards may 
under certain conditions be enforced.150 The wording of Article 53(1)(5) FAA would suggest 
that Finnish judiciaries should not be left with this discretion and that vacated awards should 
not be enforced in Finland.151 Despite some authors suggesting that the Article 53(1)(5) FAA 
should be interpreted in accordance with the New York Convention and allowing discretion 
in this manner,152 it would be probable that Finnish judiciaries would follow Swedish153 and 
                                                 
148 On attempts to unify the interpretation see most notably ILA Recommendations 2002 as well as New York 
Convention Guide. 
149 UNCITRAL Model Law Explanatory Note, p. 35. 
150 Darwazeh 2010, pp. 308–310 and 324–343. 
151 Article 53(5) FAA reads: 
"An arbitral award referred to in section 52 shall, however, not be recognized in Finland against a party 
who furnishes proof that 
[…] 
the arbitral award has not yet become binding on the parties or it has been declared null and void or set 
aside or suspended in the state in which, or under the law of which, that award was made." [unofficial 
translation] 
Therefore, not refusing recognition and enforcement of an award would require a contra legem reading of the 
provision and its wording. 
152 Ovaska 2007, p. 268. 
153 See prop. 1998/99:35, p. 180; Hobér 2011, pp. 367–370; and NJA 1992 p 733. 
 34 
German154 examples, and as a general rule, deny recognition of vacated awards. Deeper 
analysis of enforceability of vacated awards, however, falls outside the scope of this study.155 
Having concluded the brief analysis of the procedural nature of the public policy exception 
in Finnish arbitration law, the following question is what public policies may prevent the 
enforcement of foreign awards or be used to set aside an award in Finland. Hence, before 
more specific discussion on trade sanctions as public policies156, a general review of what 
has been considered to compose Finnish public policy is presented.  
3.3.2 Material scope of Finnish public policy 
Prior to the current FAA, some commentators have suggested that Finnish judges in 
commercial disputes should as a general rule only be allowed to apply procedural public 
policies in foreign judgments' recognition and enforcement proceedings.157 If this were true, 
courts would in every case be unable to give the trade sanctions any effect, had the arbitral 
tribunal failed to address them in their award. This could have significance especially in 
situations where the trade sanction was implemented after rendering the award but before 
applying for its recognition.  
The non-applicability of all substantive public policies is said to follow from the fact that 
public policies should only protect the most fundamental moral values of each society, and 
that such morals should not become applicable in commercial disputes. 158  The Finnish 
Supreme Court has even with the current FAA in force, stated obiter dictum that only clear 
errors of formal nature and relatively gross procedural errors may cause the nullity or the 
setting aside of an award.159 The context of the statement, however, clearly suggests that the 
statement is first and foremost made to emphasize the permanence of arbitral awards and not 
                                                 
154 Darwazeh 2010, pp. 329–330. 
155 For a general introduction to the question of enforcing set aside awards, see Gaillard 1999 and Darwazeh 
2010. 
156 See chapter 3.4 below. 
157 Buure-Hägglund – Esko 1980, pp. 34–35. 
158 Buure-Hägglund – Esko 1980, pp. 34–35. See also Esko 1993, p. 117. It should be noted however, that 
internationally it is not unheard of that a commercial dispute would deal with matters that would touch the 
fundamental moral values of certain societies. See e.g. the arbitration related House of Lords case Regazzoni 
v. K. C. Sethia where the apartheid policies of South Africa were indirectly taken into account when assessing 
whether the morality of trade sanctions against South Africa under the applicable English law. 
159 KKO 2008:77. 
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to make a statement regarding application of material public policy rules.160 Even if it would 
be exaggerating to interpret the statement as a categorical ban on the application of material 
grounds for setting aside an award, the ruling nonetheless emphasizes the extremely limited 
scope of court review that of foreign awards may go through in Finnish judiciaries. 
Argumentation according to which only procedural public policy rules may be applied seems 
outdated today, as national courts in the EU are in fact under an obligation to apply certain 
EU laws as public policy rules, even in commercial disputes161 and Finnish courts have at 
least in one instance refused recognition of an award due to material EU public policy162. 
Also the Government Bill to the FAA strongly implies that material public policies may 
become applicable in setting aside proceedings, even in non-EU related cases.163 Hence, 
material public policies, such as trade sanctions, may virtually certainly in some cases 
become applicable. The Government Bill regarding Section 40 FAA on the annulation of 
arbitral awards clearly states that if an award orders a performance that is forbidden in law, 
the award may be annulled. According to Heuman, this is the essential content of the allowed 
material public policy.164  
It is, however, to be emphasized that the public policy exceptions in Sections 40(1)(2) and 
52(2) FAA are to be interpreted restrictively, so as not to allow unfounded and artificial 
appeal on the award.165 Not all mandatory rules of the forum constitute its public policy.166 
                                                 
160 The statement is apparently made in relation to grounds for setting aside an award, in the limited sense, as 
they are listed in section 41 FAA (and not in relation to grounds for nullity in Section 40 FAA, such as the 
public policy principle) although the wording of the statement erroneously mentions the consequence of nullity 
as well. The statement has thus clearly unintentionally and incorrectly mentioned the consequence nullity in 
this connection. 
161 See chapter 3.4.2 below. 
162 HelHO S13/433, 14 October 2013, n:o 2705. The Turku Court of Appeal has also obiter dictum confirmed 
that errors in substance may in some cases qualify as grounds for refusal of recognition, see THO S09-2423, 
22 December 2010, n:o 3134. 
163 Although the Government Bill states that in relation to setting aside traditionally arbitral awards must only 
fulfill certain requirements of mainly formal nature (HE 202/1991 vp, p. 8) the detailed reasoning in relation 
to Article 40 FAA in the same Government Bill states that an award may be deemed null and void i.a. when 
the award orders a remedy or solution which is forbidden under Finnish law (HE 202/1991 vp, p. 25). 
164 Heuman 1999, p. 603. 
165 See Savola 2015, p. 18, stating that it would be safe to assume that Finnish courts would apply a very 
restricted criterion of public policy when enforcement of foreign awards is sought. Indeed, in most cases the 
attempts to set aside or refuse recognition and enforcement of an award do not succeed. According to Hemmo, 
out of the 8 cases to have reached Finnish courts of appeal in 1995 to 2008, where the refusal of recognition or 
setting aside was sought on a public policy basis, none succeeded. See Hemmo 2008, pp. 1062–1063 and 1066. 
166 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 25. 
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However, if the award orders a performance in kind, for example in breach with Finnish 
legislation, and leaves no other alternative than to perform in this manner, the enforcement 
judiciaries should not be forced to render a judgment that would force one of the parties to 
breach Finnish law, if the law constitutes Finnish public policy.167 If the award on the other 
hand allows performance in a manner that does not contradict with Finnish public policy, 
the award should not be set aside, or refused recognition and enforcement.  
As it appears, arbitral awards may indeed be set aside or refused recognition and enforcement 
based on substantial public policy of that country. The question therefore remains whether 
trade sanctions constitute such public policy in Finland. This will be considered in the 
following subchapters. 
 Trade sanctions and national public policies 
3.4.1 General remarks 
Before discussing trade sanctions and the public policy exception in a more strict sense of 
the word, one further related consideration should be made. It should be asked whether the 
sanctions should at all be addressed through the public policy exception, or if the issue of 
compliance with sanctions may sufficiently well be addressed by in recovery proceedings or 
by other extrajudicial authorities. For example the Swiss Federal tribunal, as well as an US 
court of appeal, have ruled that the mere existence of an economic sanction against the 
creditor does not necessarily constitute public policy in the enforcement proceedings of an 
arbitral award, implying that the payment under the award may be prevented by other means 
in the execution proceedings, without having to resort to the notion of public policy in the 
enforcement judiciaries. The Swiss Federal Tribunal, for example, merely notified the 
authorities responsible for the implementation of economic sanctions in Switzerland to 
ensure that the claim, potentially involving breach of economic sanctions, would not 
                                                 
167 Parties often agree that in case of non-delivery in kind, one of the parties may be deemed to be liable to pay 
liquidated damages. An award ordering payment of liquidated damages, due to non-performance based on an 
export prohibition or trade sanction should not as a general rule be deemed to breach public policy since it is 
merely part of the distribution of risks and liabilities between the parties. See the argumentation adopted in 
Svea Court of Appeal T 611-11. See also Gould (Ministry of Defence of Islamic Republic v. Gould Inc., 969 
F.2d 764) where only the specific performance of delivery of military goods to Iran was deemed justify the 
partial setting aside of the award on a public policy basis. 
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ultimately be satisfied. 168  This type of procedure cannot, however, most probably be 
followed in relation to the enforcement of a number of EU trade sanctions. Under these EU 
sanctions regulations, the national courts are explicitly prohibited from satisfying claims on 
enforcement of arbitral awards.169 In these cases the enforcing court is in principle under an 
obligation to address the sanctions through the public policy exception because otherwise it 
would act in breach of the sanctions regulation. If the wording of the sanction does not, 
however, explicitly require the national court to refrain from satisfying claims related to the 
sanctions, or if the question is of setting aside proceedings, it could be that a solution similar 
to that adopted by the Swiss and US judiciaries could in principle also be argued in 
Finland.170  
The above described general framework, according to which awards may be refused 
recognition and enforcement or set aside, may and even must be applied to the realm of trade 
sanctions in a number of situations. The sanctions may procedurally be given effect through 
this domestic framework of public policy, but the material contents of the public policy 
exception in relation to trade sanctions follows typically from EU law.171 Therefore the 
emphasis will be on the application of the notion of EU public policy. There are nonetheless 
some situations where purely national notions of public policy could have to be resorted to. 
This could be the case at least where: 
1. The EU has failed to enact a sanction and the sanction had then subsequently been 
domestically enacted through the Sanctions Act or not enacted at all; or 
                                                 
168 See Swiss Federal Tribunal in 4A_250/2013 where the Swiss Federal Tribunal lined that the existence of a 
UN obligation to freeze Iranian assets, a financial sanction, implemented also by Switzerland, does not 
constitute public policy and may thus not be used to refuse recognition of an award, but nonetheless stated that 
it will send a copy of its judgment to the authority responsible for administering the sanctions, as the execution 
of the award could possibly breach Swiss sanctions regulations aimed against Iran. See also District Court of 
Delaware in National Oil Corporation  v. Libyan Sun Oil Company, where the court deemed that the fact that 
the enforcement of the award could breach US financial sanctions against Libya did not as such constitute a 
breach of public policy and that only the execution of the award should be stayed.  
169 See i.a. Articles 1 and 6 Council Regulation (EU) No 692/2014 of 23 June 2014, as amended by Council 
Regulations (EU) No 825/2014 of 30 July 2014 and (EU) No 1351/2014 of 18 December 2014, on import 
prohibitions on goods originating from Crimea. See also Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 
2012 on trade restrictions with Iran, containing similar provisions. 
170 What the procedure for this type of action were, would be unclear and depend on the particulars of each 
case. It could be for example that the enforcement court would completely disregard the existence of sanctions 
and trust the bailiff with the control of the sanctions. It could also be that the court would give its decision on 
enforcement of the award on the condition that the sanctions be lifted, since no unambiguous rule prohibiting 
such procedure seems to exist. 
171 See chapter 3.5 below.  
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2. The trade sanction has been embodied in foreign law, but the Finnish judiciaries 
would consider that  
a. the application; or  
b. the non-application by arbitrators of such law would result in contradiction 
with the Finnish domestic public policy. 
As was already discussed above, the first mentioned case is highly unlikely, since according 
to the Government Bill for the amendment of the Sanctions Act, the Finnish government no 
longer imposes sanctions outside the auspices of the EU.172 Should the EU for some reason 
fail to impose a UN sanction and should such an autonomous national sanction be imposed 
instead, the Finnish judiciaries would most likely require blatant and manifest violations of 
these sanctions before a breach of sanction could be deemed to contradict with Finnish public 
policy. As presented by Hemmo, arbitral awards are generally very strictly complied with 
by Finnish judiciaries and the public policy exception is very restrictively interpreted.173  
As noted above, an award may be set aside i.a. when the award orders a remedy or solution 
which is forbidden under Finnish law.174 Not only is breaching sanctions forbidden under 
Finnish law but also criminally sanctioned.175 Furthermore, multilateral trade sanctions are 
part of Finland’s international obligations, the primacy and significance of which in the 
Finnish legal system is well illustrated by the fact that it is in Section 1 of the Finnish 
Constitution (731/1999) where it is stated that Finland shall participate in international 
cooperation to protect peace and human rights and to develop the society. The first Section 
of the Constitution is said to illustrate the basis of values on which the Constitution is built.176 
With this backdrop, it would be very much imaginable that multilateral trade sanctions, 
international obligations in themselves and typically designed to protect peace or other core 
values of the international community, could be considered to form Finnish public policy. 
Even if a UN sanction for whatever reason had not been imposed to the Finnish law, it could 
be possible that the Finnish judiciaries could set aside or refuse recognition of an award 
                                                 
172 HE 288/2014 vp, p. 17. 
173 Hemmo 2008, pp. 1066–1067. 
174 HE 202/1991 vp, p. 25. 
175 See chapter 2.3 above. Similarly, breaching blocking statutes has also been sanctioned under Finnish law, 
although not in the Criminal Code (Article 3 Blocking Statute Act). 
176 HE 1/1998 vp, p. 71. 
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based on Finnish international obligations and fundamental principles. For example the ILA 
Recommendations name states' international obligations, the prime example of which is 
UNSC sanctions, as one of the categories of public policies.177 Also the Swiss Federal 
Tribunal has prior to the Swiss accession to the UN considered that the existence of UN trade 
sanctions may be used to set aside an award that has failed to consider the sanctions and 
orders a performance in breach of the sanctions.178 Following similar reasoning, it could be 
asserted that Finnish judiciaries should apply the sanctions as Finnish public policies even if 
they have not been transposed into Finnish law. 179  The existence of multilateral trade 
sanctions constitutes a presumption that the sanction could constitute a transnational, 
universal public policy.  
As already noted above, the enforcing court should nonetheless apply the public policy 
exception only when truly necessary. Therefore, only if the contractual obligation whose 
performance would constitute a breach of public policy was an unavoidable consequence of 
the award with no alternatives such as payment of liquidated damages, should the court resort 
to public policy considerations. 180 
A second scenario where national courts could contemplate the refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of an award on a Finnish public policy basis, is one where a foreign trade 
sanction has been given effect in an award but the Finnish court would deem that the sanction 
and its underlying rationale would run counter to the fundamental principles of Finnish law. 
This question essentially pertains to the category of fundamental principles, or states' 
                                                 
177 See ILA Recommendations p. 3. 
178 BGer 4C.172/2000. The Swiss Federal Tribunal seems lately, after its accession to the UN, to have taken a 
potentially more stringent approach to the contents of UN sanctions as possible obstacles for recognition of 
arbitral awards. In a 2014 award 4A_250/2013, it concluded that the mere existence of UN mandated financial 
sanctions (i.e. not trade sanctions) against Iran may not be considered as a public policy obstacle to the 
performance of a contract between Israeli and Iranian parties, especially as the claimant had failed to invoke 
the existence of sanctions at lower courts.  
179 See also the German Supreme Court in II ZR 113/70 where the court deemed that a UNESCO convention 
prohibiting the export of cultural goods could be taken into account when assessing whether Nigerian 
legislation prohibiting exports of cultural goods could be taken into account even when Germany had not 
ratified the convention. This example too demonstrates that states' international obligations and multilateral 
treaties, even if not ratified by the state, may be taken into account when resolving a dispute. 
180  The performance hence has to be truly illegal. An illustrative example from American praxis is that of 
Parsons (U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit 74-1642, 74-1676) where a mere diplomatic breakdown 
between US and Egypt was not enough to refuse recognition and enforcement of an award against an American 
party for the benefit of an Egyptian corporation. Given the general pro-enforcement tendencies in Finland, 
similar limited interpretations of the public policy exception could be expected. 
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obligations towards other states, as discussed above in relation to the ILA 
Recommendations. Could it be so that a fundamental principle of Finnish law could thwart 
the legitimate application of foreign law? Such situation seems unlikely, yet it is imaginable 
that the enforcement of an award would be opposed based on e.g. a racially motivated import 
ban that had been applied as a part of the otherwise applicable foreign law. In these cases, 
the racially motivated ban could in principle be opposed by resorting to notions of bonos 
mores or by invoking a human rights convention the state has concluded.  
The vast majority of cases relating to trade sanctions, however, do not pertain to issues such 
as racial discrimination. Situations where the arbitral tribunal has simply failed to consider 
trade sanctions of a foreign country form a more realistic problem. The question could also 
be formulated as to whether Finnish judiciaries should consider the public policies and trade 
sanctions of foreign states. These issues are discussed in the following chapter. 
3.4.2 Foreign trade sanctions as public policy in Finland 
Answering the question of foreign laws and Finnish public policy should be started by 
examining the Finnish law pertaining to setting aside and refusal of recognition and 
enforcement of arbitral awards. As was already noted above, the wordings of Sections 52(2) 
and 40(1)(2) FAA expressly refer only to Finnish public policy. 181  Further, the FAA 
Government Bill sets out that an arbitral award should not be declared invalid in cases where 
no public interest is involved.182 Strictly interpreted this would mean that no violation of 
foreign law would render the award unenforceable and that in such cases, Finnish public 
interest would always have to be concerned. The view that under New York Convention, 
public policy refers exclusively to the public policy of the enforcement state is also 
confirmed by a number of writers internationally.183 
                                                 
181 Both provisions refer to "Suomen oikeusjärjestyksen perusteet", literally "the fundamentals of Finnish legal 
order". See also Article 34(b)(ii) Model Law and Section 33(2) SAA that provide an essentially similar 
wording. Even Article V.2(b) New York Convention refers to the" public policy of that country". The drafters 
of the convention did not thus seek to harmonize the application of the public policy exemption. See ILA 
Interim Report 2000, p. 8 and Born 2014, p. 3650. 
182 Government Bill 1991/202, p. 8. 
183 Gaillard–Savage 1999, pp. 954–955; ILA Interim Report p. 30 and Redfern et al. 2009, p. 657. 
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Some commentators have, however, expressed a contrary view promoting a very wide 
applicability of the public policy exception in the FAA. According to them, even foreign 
public policies, i.e. laws of countries other than Finland, could in certain cases be taken into 
account as public policy rules.184 The interpretation would seem to be in line with British 
practice where national courts have deemed that they are even under an obligation to respect 
the public policies of other friendly countries, given that such rules would render the 
contractual performance illegal. For example in Soleimany v. Soleimany185 the English Court 
of appeal refused to enforce an award based on Iranian revenue laws and export controls. 
The British view that puts weight to the comity between nations is internationally considered 
exceptional.186 
The IUGAS v. Naftogaz ruling by the Svea Court of Appeal in Sweden could also be 
interpreted as pointing to the direction of wide applicability of foreign public policies. 187 In 
the said case, a dispute had risen between a Ukrainian and an Italian company over a gas 
delivery agreement under Swedish substantive law and with a reference to SCC arbitration. 
Subsequently, the SCC tribunal had in its decision ordered the appellant to deliver gas abroad 
despite alleged restrictions to gas exports set in the Ukrainian legislation. At the setting aside 
proceedings in the Svea Court of Appeal, the appellant thus purported that ordering to carry 
out the gas deliveries was against Swedish and Ukrainian public policies.188 In its decision, 
the Swedish court concluded that Ukrainian public policy might in principle be applied in 
truly international situations, given that the public policy rule falls into the category of 
international public policy. However because no complete ban on gas exports was in place, 
the court of appeal concluded that international public policy could not have been violated. 
Svea Court of Appeal's conception of international public policy raises questions even if 
international public policy was ultimately not applied in this individual case. In assessing 
the conformity with Swedish and Ukrainian public policies, the court of appeal has de facto 
invoked Ukrainian legislation under the denomination of international public policy. In this 
                                                 
184 Kurkela – Uoti 1994, p. 78 and Kurkela 1996, pp. 127–128. 
185 See Soleimany v. Soleimany [1999] QB 785. 
186 ILA Interim Report, p. 31. 
187 Svea Court of Appeal, 2 July 2012, Case No. T 611-11. 
188 The contents of Section 33 SAA on nullity of arbitral awards based on public policy exception are essentially 
convergent with the Section 40 FAA. Both state that the potentially nullified award shall be against the 
fundamentals of their respective country's legal order. 
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respect, the ruling is also somewhat imprecise in its definition of international public policy. 
Even though the ILA Recommendations, invoked by the Court of Appeal, seek to harmonize 
the contents of the international public policy exception and its relation to national public 
policy in international arbitration, the ILA Recommendations do not in any way stand 
supportive of the application of foreign mandatory rules.189 The ILA Interim Report, a 
commentary to the ILA Recommendations even effectively states that foreign public policies 
should not be considered part of the public policy of the place of proceedings.190 The concept 
of international public policy in the ILA Report should rather be interpreted as urging the 
national courts to refrain from creating their own innovative interpretations of public 
policies.191 A guide by United Nations Commission on International Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
on the interpretation of the New York Convention also suggests that courts should refrain 
from applying foreign public policies.192 If the Swedish Court of Appeal would have wished 
to apply Swedish law in accordance with ILA Recommendations, it should not have applied 
any foreign public policies.  
Under Finnish law, both Sections 40(1)(2) and 52(2) FAA refer to the fundamentals of 
Finnish legal order. An interpretation allowing the application of foreign public policies 
would seem to be in contradiction with the prevailing jurisprudential and interpretive view 
according to which acts issued by the parliament of Finland should, as a general rule, be 
interpreted according to their wording.193 It has been argued that a principle of regulatory 
economy, should prevail, stating that no element of the legal text should be without 
significance.194 Furthermore, both Finnish and Swedish scholars have emphasized that an 
expansive interpretation of statutory acts is allowed only to the extent such interpretation is 
not a linguistically excluded possibility.195 As a consequence, all this would seem to imply 
that foreign public policy could only be taken into account only where it coincides with 
Finnish public policy, i.e. when Finnish national law contains essentially similar public 
                                                 
189 For what is meant by public policy in the ILA Recommendations, see ILA Final Report 2002, p. 3. 
190 ILA Interim Report, p. 30. The Interim Report states that the view in Germany, France and most other 
countries seems to be that foreign public policies should not be taken into account. The Report does however 
acknowledge that English court practice seems to enable the application of foreign public policy rules in certain 
cases, with a reference to the Soleimany case referred to above. 
191 Koulu 2007, p. 253. 
192 New York Convention Guide, Article V(2)(b), paragraph 21. 
193 Hirvonen 2011, p. 39. 
194 Aarnio 1982, p.103. 
195 Aarnio 1982, p. 107 and Peczenik 1975, p. 80. 
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policy provisions. This could be the case i.a. with multilateral trade sanctions that are 
imposed by the UN and shared by a number of countries.  
The ruling in IUGAS v. Naftogaz could also naturally be read so that not following foreign 
trade restrictions (i.e. public policy rules, lois de police) would constitute a breach of some 
fundamental principle of the Swedish legal order and thus be against Swedish public policy. 
However, the argumentation according to which it is national public policy not to support 
activities that are illegal in other "civilized" jurisdictions196 is not especially well founded, 
since the function of public policy control at the stage of enforcement or setting aside, is 
obviously not to reassess the parties' behavior under the otherwise applicable law, but rather 
to ensure that certain minimum standards at the place of arbitration or enforcement are 
respected.197 The courts at the place of arbitration or enforcement should not aim to balance 
the parties' contractual relationship, let alone further third country interests at the parties’ 
expense. 
Based on the above remarks on the current legislation and case law, the only viable 
interpretation of the Finnish law provision regarding foreign public policies' applicability 
would seem to be that, as a general rule, no foreign public policies should be applied in 
Finnish setting aside or recognition and enforcement proceedings. Finnish judiciaries are 
only guardians of Finnish public policy.198 Therefore, foreign unilateral sanctions that are 
not implemented in Finnish or EU legislation should not be taken into account as foreign 
public policies, and arbitral awards should not be set aside or denied recognition based on 
the fact that a foreign sanction was not respected. In cases like IUGAS v. Naftogaz discussed 
above, the party seeking to invoke the public policy exception may in most cases as well 
invoke it before the arbitral tribunal, or in the last instance in the courts of the country of 
enforcement. If the invoked rule actually is public policy in the said country, the courts there 
will in all probability agree apply it, often even sua sponte. The purpose of the judicial 
                                                 
196 Kurkela 1996, p. 128 and Voser 1996, p. 352. 
197 See also similar reasoning adopted in Swiss Supreme Court's reasoning in the Hilmarton/OTV case 17 April 
1990. See also more recent BGE 132 III 389, where the Swiss Federal Tribunal concluded that EU competition 
law should not form a part of the Swiss public policy. 
198 For this reason, the state judiciaries should not give special weight to any public policy provisions of the lex 
causae either. Only when failing to follow the lex causae's public policy provisions also comprises a breach of 
the public policy of the seat of the court, should the public policy rules be given effect. Failing to follow the 
principle of party autonomy cannot therefore as such constitute a reason for refusing to recognize the award. 
See also Lalive 1987, p. 302. 
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control of arbitral awards at the place of arbitral proceedings is to guarantee certain minimum 
requirements pertaining to judicial relief and legal protection.199 Since the public policy may 
be used to artificially promote illicit state interest on the parties' expense, expansive 
interpretations should be avoided and the arbitral award should be interfered with to the least 
extent possible. 
 EU public policy  
3.5.1 EU public policy in general 
In practice, all trade sanction applicable in Finland are implemented by means of EU 
regulations. Hence, EU legislation and the notion of public policy therein comprises an 
essential and imperative part of Finnish public policy for the purposes of this study.200 EU 
law is part of Finnish legal order. In recent years, the EU has imposed its own conception of 
public policy into the member states' legislation, and if a trade sanction is deemed to form a 
part of this EU public policy, the award failing to give effect to the sanction may have to be 
set aside or denied recognition and enforcement in the member states' courts. These courts 
are in the last resort responsible for judicial control of compliance with EU law.201  
In the field of EU public policies, most practical relevance and attention in literature is 
normally attributed to questions pertaining to EU competition law and most notably Article 
101 TFEU202. In the well-known Eco Swiss judgment203, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (“CJEU”) confirmed that the said article of the TFEU forms a part of a community 
                                                 
199 See Möller 1997, p. 84. 
200 Koulu 2007, p. 253. Generally on the notion of public policy in the EU, see Corthaut 2012. 
201 See Ovaska 2007, p. 255 and the CJEU Nordsee judgment C-102/81, where the CJEU confirmed that arbitral 
tribunals as such are not " courts or tribunals of member states" but nonetheless stressed the importance of 
national judicial review by stating that:  
"[I]f questions of community law are raised in an arbitration resorted to by agreement the ordinary courts 
may be called upon to examine them […] in the course of a review of an arbitration award […] which they 
may be required to effect in case of an appeal or objection, in proceedings for leave to issue execution or by 
any other method of recourse available under the relevant national legislation".  
202 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012/C 326/01) (“TFEU”). 
203 Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV.  The facts of the Eco Swiss case 
are as follows: Benetton had licensed Eco Swiss to manufacture watches and clocks under its trademark. Under 
their agreement, Eco Swiss was prohibited from selling the products outside Italy. This type of market sharing 
is as a general rule against EU competition law. The arbitrator in the case, resolving the parties' dispute had 
failed to take the competition law provisions into account. The question before Dutch judiciaries was essentially 
whether the award could be set aside based on the non-compliance with the EU competition law rules. The 
Dutch court then requested a preliminary ruling regarding the public policy status of the said rules. 
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public policy applicable by the national courts ex officio. The CJEU confirmed that if a court 
should follow national procedural rules, such as those pertaining to the domestic public 
policy exception, then the court is equally obligated to follow similar rules of EU nature.204 
This effectively means that national courts are deprived of their procedural autonomy under 
their respective national laws in defining the contents of their public policies, the general 
rule under EU law, and put under an obligation to follow EU public policy rules, as they are 
finally defined by the CJEU. Procedural autonomy, a notion that includes determining the 
contents of each member state’s public policy is indeed the main rule under EU law, one that 
may be ousted based on principles of effectiveness and equivalence.205 In Eco Swiss, the 
CJEU deemed that the effective protection of the internal market required the national 
procedural autonomy to be thwarted. 
Besides the Eco Swiss case, the CJEU has in two more recent judgments, in Mostaza Claro206 
and Asturcom207 ruled that certain consumer protection rules, namely the right for a customer 
to abstain from arbitration and have their case heard before a court of law, equally form a 
part of EU public policy. Otherwise European case law offers very little assistance in 
interpreting the position and contents of EU public policy in relation to the exequatur of 
arbitral awards. EU legislation too lacks a list or any other comprehensive method for 
determining which other rules constitute EU public policy. The case law relating to EU 
public policies in relation to enforcement of judgments offers little help either. In Krombach, 
the CJEU determined that the public policy exception under the Brussels Convention, the 
predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation, is of strict interpretation, may only be invoked in 
exceptional circumstances and that member states have some room for determining their 
                                                 
204 Eco Swiss, paragraph 37 and Bermann 2012, p. 412. 
205 On the contents of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, see Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v. 
Centro Móvil, paragraph 24.:”According to settled case-law, in the absence of relevant Community rules, the 
detailed procedural rules designed to ensure the protection of the rights which individuals acquire under 
Community law are a matter for the domestic legal order of each Member State, under the principle of the 
procedural autonomy of the Member States, provided that they are not less favourable than those governing 
similar domestic situations (principle of equivalence) and that they do not render impossible in practice or 
excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by the Community legal order (principle of effectiveness)”. 
These principles have their base in Article 19 TEU according to which member States shall provide remedies 
sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.  
206 Case C-168/05 Mostaza Claro v. Centro Móvil. 
207 Case C-40/08 Asturcom Telecomunicaciones SL v. Cristina Rodríguez Nogueira. 
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public policy but that room is limited by the EU law.208 In the other notable case relating to 
the public policy exception under the Brussels regime, the Maxicar case 209 , similar 
requirements were applied to competition law matters. These principles, while they very 
much remind the general principles under i.a. the New York Convention, do not offer much 
help in defining the contents of public policy in arbitral context. The contents of EU public 
policy will thus have to be determined on a provision-by-provision or field-by-field basis 
based on the coming practice of the CJEU.210 How would such determination be made and 
on what basis should given rules be considered as forming a part of the EU public policy? 
These questions will be discussed below. 
In Eco Swiss, the CJEU held that the public policy nature of certain provisions of law can at 
least in part be derived from the fact that such rules are "essential to the accomplishment of 
the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular for the functioning of the internal 
market".211 Mostaza Claro and Asturcom confirmed this position, and further stated that 
certain consumer protection rules should be considered community public policy as they are 
"essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular 
in raising the standard of living and the quality of life in the territory".212 The category of 
rules essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the [EU], recurring in the 
CJEU's rulings, seems to be a remarkably broad one and as such appears to allow the 
application of numerous provisions of law as international public policy. Different authors 
have in academic writings predicted that i.a. employee and environmental protection as well 
as occupational health and safety would in CJEU be regarded as such essential rules, thus 
constituting a part of EU public policy. 213  Also some liberal economic values, best 
exemplified by the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital, the very heart of 
European cooperation, have in literature often been considered as probable EU public policy 
rules.214  
                                                 
208 Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v. André Bamberski, paragraphs 29–45. In Krombach the question was of 
certain procedural public policy principles. 
209 Case C-38/98 Régie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento. 
210 Bermann 2011, p. 1207. 
211 Eco Swiss, paragraph 36. 
212 Mostaza Claro, paragraph 37 and Asturcom, paragraph 51. 
213 See Bermann 2012, pp. 418–419 and Schlosser 1997, pp. 86–87.  
214 Bermann 2012, p. 419. 
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The Mostaza Claro and Asturcom judgments have demonstrated that also secondary EU law 
may be applied as an EU public policy, if the values protected in the secondary EU law are 
deemed adequately important and protected in the EU treaties.215 In Mostaza Claro and 
Asturcom, the CJEU emphasized the importance of public interest underlying the protection 
which the directive offered, and deduced the mandatory status of the provision from the fact 
that consumer protection advances the interest of raising the standard of living and quality 
of life, protected in Article 3 of the then European Community Treaty 216 . Such 
argumentation, underlining the effet utile of the piece of EU legislation, would seem to allow 
even broader conception of public policy than that previously applied in Eco Swiss. In Eco 
Swiss, the provision itself was essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
Community whereas in Mostaza Claro and Asturcom only the aim of the directive is in this 
way essential. According to Mostaza Claro, the fact that a consumer protection rule 
promotes a goal that is necessary for the fulfilment of the internal market, one of the 
objectives of the community, results in the public policy status of that norm. Furthermore, it 
could even be asserted that a widely held EU principle, the principle of proportionality 
suggests that EU should not be warranted to enact legislation unless it is necessary for the 
objectives of the Treaties. Therefore, under the reasoning adopted in Mostaza Claro, a 
notably large part, maybe even all of all EU legislation could form EU public policy, since 
under the principle of proportionality EU legislation should necessarily advance interests 
protected in the EU Treaties.217  
                                                 
215 In both  Mostaza Claro and Asturcom the question was about the public policy status of directive 93/13/EEC 
of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, a piece of secondary EU legislation. In 2002 before 
Mostaza Claro and Asturcom, Ojanen had argued that only primary EU law¸ i.e. EU Treaties, their 
amendments, annexes and treaties of accession could constitute public policy rules, and that secondary EU law 
outside these sources of law could not form a part of EU public policy. Ojanen even concluded that most 
probably the public policy nature could only be attributed to such primary EU legislation that is directly 
horizontally applicable. See Ojanen 2002, pp. 69–71 and Ovaska 2007, p. 45 concurring with Ojanen. With 
Mostaza Claro and Asturcom, these interpretations have proved wrong. 
216 Article 3 of the then European Community Treaty does not have an exact corollary in the TEU, but some 
of its elements have been included in the current Article 3(2) TEU. 
217 Bermann 2012, p. 417. On principle of proportionality, see Article 5 TEU. It should be noted, however, that 
the principle of proportionality requires the measures of EU law to be "only" necessary whereas Eco Swiss, 
Mostaza Claro and Asturcom set the threshold for public policy status at essential rules. Further, it could be 
rightly questioned whether all EU legislation in reality is truly necessary, as required by the principle of 
proportionality. Be that as it may, the argumentation adopted in Mostaza Claro sets the threshold of EU public 
policy notably low. 
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Nonetheless, CJEU did not in Eco Swiss, Mostaza Claro or Asturcom state that all EU law, 
or even any specific fields of law, would as such constitute public policy. In some non-
arbitration related judicial proceedings, the CJEU has in fact denied the public policy nature 
of certain provisions of EU law.218 However, compared to the traditional arbitral and national 
conceptions of public policy, the notion adopted by the CJEU appears to be a broad one. 
Whereas the public policy exception in international arbitration and in enforcing courts 
typically covers only the most flagrant cases, EU public policy under the CJEU's practice 
seems to entail a number of different provisions only waiting to be identified as public policy 
rules. For example, the competition law provisions protected by EU public policies would 
most likely not be protected by mere national public policies.219 It has been suggested, quite 
rightly so, that EU public policy seems largely to serve a purpose of emphasizing the 
paramountcy of EU law vis-à-vis the law of the Member States.220  
National courts seem also willing to enforce the broad categories of public policy, as set out 
by the CJEU. In a 2013 Court of Appeal ruling221, the Helsinki Court of Appeal denied 
recognition of a Latvian arbitral award rendered against a Finnish consumer based on the 
public policy status of an EU directive and the argumentation adopted in Asturcom. The 
Court of Appeal concluded that based on Asturcom, the notion of Finnish public policy must 
also include the consumer protection rules set out in the relevant EU directive. 
3.5.2 EU public policy and trade sanctions 
The fact that EU public policy appears to cover such broad categories of Union rules, raises 
a question whether all EU trade sanctions should also be considered as constituting a part of 
such public policy, should they be assessed by the CJEU. When assessing this question, 
particular attention should be paid to the interest protected by the trade sanctions, since the 
                                                 
218 See Joined Cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05, Van der Weerd et al. v. Minister van Landbouw where provisions 
regarding the measures to control foot and mouth disease were not granted public policy status. However, since 
the notion of public policy in national courts in non-arbitration related matters and arbitral tribunals is 
essentially different, no far-reaching conclusions may be drawn from this practice. See chapter 1.3 above and 
Lew et al. 2003, pp. 491–492. 
219 Ovaska 2007, p. 45. Notably, also in the Eco Swiss case the Dutch judiciaries requesting the preliminary 
ruling had stated that the competition law provisions would not under Dutch law had been considered as public 
policy rules. See Eco Swiss paragraph 24. 
220 Bermann 2012, p. 419. 
221 HelHO S13/433, 14 October 2013, n:o 2705. 
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CJEU seems to have justified the public policy status mainly based on the protected interest 
and its significance for the EU and its objectives.  
All EU trade sanctions are adopted based on Article 215 TFEU that allows interruption or 
reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with a third country 
where such restrictive measures are necessary to achieve the objectives of the CFSP. The 
Union's and its member states' security interests as such have often been considered as values 
that must be protected with the notion of public policy.222 Also objectives of the CFSP, set 
out in Title V of the TEU223 , including i.a. safeguarding Union's fundamental values, 
supporting democracy, rule of law and human rights, encouraging the integration of all 
countries into the world economy as well as preserving peace, preventing conflicts and 
strengthening international security224, have often been considered essential to the EU.225  
These values and principles are obviously what trade sanctions adopted by the EU aim to 
protect.226 
Looking to the argumentation and the expansionist tendencies adopted by the CJEU in Eco 
Swiss, Mostaza Claro and Asturcom as well as to the primary law basis and the gravity of 
the public interests the EU sanctions aim to protect, it would seem possible, even likely, that 
the CJEU would, if faced with a preliminary ruling regarding the public policy status of EU 
sanctions, classify the sanctions as EU public policy. It would be easily argued that the trade 
sanctions were essential to the tasks entrusted to the EU. This could have wide repercussions 
for national courts, which would be obligated to give effect to such trade sanctions as EU 
public policies in both setting aside as well as recognition and enforcement proceedings. 
Similarly, EU mandated blocking statutes could easily be argued to constitute EU public 
policy. They purport to serve the objectives of the EU including contributing to the 
harmonious development of world trade and to the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
                                                 
222 See Corthaut 2012, pp. 258–261 and the CJEU case law referenced therein. 
223 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2012/C 326/01) ( “TEU”). 
224 See most notably Article 21 TEU. 
225 Corthaut 2012, pp. 274–277. 
226 See Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures (Sanctions), 10198/1/04, setting out the general 
guidelines according to which the EU uses restrictive measures, i.e. economic sanctions. Accoring to the 
principles, the EU is committed to the effective use of sanctions as an important way to maintain and restore 
international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter and of our common 
foreign and security policy. 
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international trade.227 They are typically implemented based on articles in the EU treaties 
that aim to protect international trade and to protect the common market.228 These values 
may similarly be held so important for the EU so that they would warrant the public policy 
status of the blocking statutes.  
Therefore, in a given case, even if the award orders performance in contradiction with EU 
trade sanctions or blocking statutes, it could be possible that Finnish courts would set aside 
or deny recognition and enforceability of such award, based on an EU notion of public 
policy. It should be noted, however, that the mere fact that a rule may be considered public 
policy in a single case, does not make it applicable as public policy in all situations 
concerning such rule. 229  Rather, the national court ruling in a given setting aside or 
enforcement case, should examine if the outcome of the award were to be inappropriate, 
against the fundamental principles of Finnish legal order, should no public policy rule be 
taken into consideration. As discussed above, the award should order a specific performance 
blatantly in breach of sanctions before the performance of the award could be deemed to 
breach sanctions. However, if applying the public policy effectively protects the valid 
interests and is, all things considering, appropriate, the national court should be allowed to 
apply it. EU trade sanctions should presumptively be held to protect widely held values and 
interests. 
                                                 
227 Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996, preamble. The said regulation blocks the truly 
extraterritorial applicability of US sanctions against Iran and Cuba. 
228 For example the above mentioned Council Regulation 2271/96 is implemented based on Articles 73c, 113 
and 235 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Articles 64, 207 and 352 TFEU) that aim to 
protect the free movement of goods and capital and the common commercial policy. 
229 See i.a. Koulu 2007, p. 248 and Klami – Kuisma 2000, p. 81. Internationally, see also the Court of Appeals 
of Paris in the Thalès case (SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE Euromissile, Cour d'appel de Paris, 2005 II 10038, 
18 November 2004) where the court concluded that the breach of public policy must be manifest, effective and 
specific ("flagrante, effective et spécifique"). Also the Article V(2)(b) New York Convention states that an 
award may be refused recognition and enforcement when "the recognition or enforcement of the award would 
be contrary to the public policy of that country" [emphasis here]. New York Convention thus refers to the 
concrete act of recognizing and enforcing and not to the contents of such law. 
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4 Trade sanctions as a limitation to choice of law in 
arbitral tribunals 
 Public policies in international arbitration 
As will be noted below, trade sanctions may in certain cases constitute rules of public policy 
or foreign mandatory rules in international arbitration. The concept of public policy and 
mandatory rules in arbitral proceedings is, however, fundamentally different than that in 
setting aside and enforcement proceedings. 230  Arbitration's essentially contractual and 
international, some could even say transnational character, causes the notions of public 
policy and mandatory rules in arbitral proceedings to take a different form; to emphasize 
more the principle of party autonomy and the consensual nature of arbitration and to take a 
step away from the notion of public policy in national judiciaries that purports to serve 
essentially national interests. Unlike a national judge that may merely depend upon its own 
national notion of public policy to decide whether to give effect to a rule, the arbitrator must 
strike a delicate balance between the parties’ will on the one hand and the national interests 
of possibly multiple sovereign states on the other. 
The general rule and the starting point in international arbitration has however typically been 
the parties’ power to decide on virtually all matters concerning the procedure of their dispute 
before the arbitral tribunal, including the choice of applicable law.231 As Pierre Lalive put it 
in a 1971 award: 
"There are few principles more universally admitted in private international law 
than that referred to by the standard terms of the 'proper law of the contract'—
according to which the law governing the contract, is that which has been chosen 
                                                 
230 See i.a. Swiss Federal Court decisions BGE 132 III 389 p. 399 and BGE 120 II 155 where the existence of 
a difference between the two types of public policy is explicitly stated. In both judgments the Federal Court 
deemed that the notion of public policy in enforcement proceedings should be an attenuated one, narrower than 
that applied by the arbitrator. As was discussed above, however, the Swiss conception of public policy does 
not correspond to that of i.a. EU judiciaries and far-reaching conclusions should not be drawn from Swiss 
practice. 
231 The freedom of parties' to choose the law applicable to their dispute is recognized in virtually all national 
legislations as well as in the rules of basically all arbitration institutions. See i.a. Section 31(2) FAA; Article 
28(1) UNCITRAL Model Law; Article 28 FAI Rules; Article 22 SCC Rules. The SAA does not explicitly 
recognize the right but it has been considered a founding principle in the law and the upcoming review of the 
SAA may change the situation, see SOU 2015:37, p. 92. 
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by the parties, whether expressly or (with certain differences or variations 
according to the various systems) tacitly."232 
Applying public policy rules, e.g. trade sanctions, other than those in the applicable law 
chosen by the parties, is a clear limitation to this main principle of proper law of the contract. 
If a trade sanction is a part of the law-proper of the contract and the parties have not explicitly 
excluded its application, the arbitrator should, as a general rule, apply the sanction. The 
parties' autonomy in the choice of law should be respected. Also, as a general rule, the 
arbitrator should refrain from giving effect to any and all trade sanctions, or other public 
policy rules, that do not form a part of the proper law of the contract as this would not be in 
line with the main principle of party autonomy. As the US Supreme Court stated in the well-
known Mitsubishi case: "the international arbitral tribunal owes no prior allegiance to the 
legal norms of particular states"233. The only prior allegiance should be to the will of the 
parties. An arbitrator, unlike national judges, does not have a forum that would impose some 
strict limitations to the choice of substantive law by the parties and for an arbitrator, each 
law outside the lex causae is on an equal footing and may be taken into consideration only 
to a limited extent.234  
Only following the will of the parties does not, however, observe the existence of state, 
public and third party interests. Mandatory rules, such as trade sanctions, exist for a reason, 
and may legitimately work to prevent unwanted behavior by other states or private 
individuals. The question again is how to balance the autonomy of the parties with these 
interests. This issue becomes even more complicated when the mandatory rules claiming 
applicability are part of a law foreign to the contract. How should such foreign public policies 
be considered by the arbitrator?  
Two separate, yet largely overlapping main schools of thought have tried to bring clarity to 
the above question. The first, the theory of transnational public policy, depends more heavily 
on the parties' autonomy, and emphasizes that only if the award were to run counter to widely 
recognized morals and values should the parties' autonomy be interfered with. Arbitration is 
                                                 
232 ICC Award 1512. 
233 United States Supreme Court in 473 U.S. 614 (1985), (Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc), 02.07.1985. 
234 See i.a. Goldman 1963, p. 443. See also Derains 1987 pp. 231–232; Lalive 1987, pp. 271–272. 
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considered a de-nationalized means of resolving disputes and the decision to give or not to 
give effect to foreign mandatory rules is based on the moral value that a specific rule carries, 
brought into comparison with the widely held values of the international community. The 
second theory, that of foreign mandatory rules, on the other hand, emphasizes the legislator's 
intention and the national legislation, the closeness of connection between the rule and the 
dispute, the consequence of application or non-application as well as the legitimacy of the 
claim of the foreign mandatory rule. Following this school of thought, the arbitrators are 
indeed empowered, and maybe even under a duty to truly apply the rules of foreign law, and 
not only consider them based on the moral values they carry.235 
The theories do, however, also overlap, and arbitrators are not bound to consider the issues 
of public policy through only one of the theories. However, some authors tend to limit 
themselves to the transnational public policy method, sometimes by extending the notion of 
what constitutes truly international, transnational public policy, to a relatively great extent. 
Others take foreign mandatory rules into account as such, yet still, when assessing whether 
or not to consider them, place much significance on the moral value the foreign mandatory 
rule carries. In this way, the demarcation between the two theories not as clear as it first may 
seem. 
The presentation below is divided so that the method of transnational public policy will be 
discussed first. The method relies on transnationally held conceptions of morality, an 
equivalent of the notion of public policy in national courts, as discussed above. The method 
is best employed in the context of certain multilateral sanctions and in a certain cases where 
the arbitrator wishes to refuse application of certain unilateral trade sanctions in the lex 
causae. After considering the transnational public policy method, it is discussed whether 
arbitrators should at all consider mandatory rules of other states as legal rules, or rather use 
the tools such as the notion of force majeure in the lex causae to determine the applicability 
of foreign rules. This preliminary question will have to be answered in order to determine 
whether trade sanctions may in the first place be asses through the foreign mandatory rules 
method. In relation to foreign mandatory rules, it is first examined whether arbitrators 
entitled or whether they must apply mandatory rules other than those in the lex causae. Then, 
                                                 
235 Gaillard – Savage 1999, pp. 851–852.  
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this study discusses the effect of the notion of public policy of the places of arbitration and 
enforcement judiciaries, as discussed above in chapter 3. The final subchapter then discusses 
a general method for exercising discretion over the application of foreign mandatory rules 
and trade sanctions in particular, the special connection method.236 
First, however, few preliminary remarks regarding the trade sanctions in the law chosen by 
the parties, the lex causae. How should they be considered within the framework of choice 
of law issues? 
 Trade sanctions in lex causae 
As a general rule, the law chosen by the parties should be respected and applied as a whole, 
including all its mandatory rules.237 It could be asked, however, how the trade sanctions or 
any other mandatory rules that have come into force only after the conclusion of the parties' 
contract, i.e. subsequent trade sanctions, should be treated. Should the sanction nevertheless 
be applied just as any other mandatory rule in that law, despite the fact that the parties cannot 
be considered to have chosen to apply the trade sanctions imposed only after the conclusion 
of their contract? 
Generally, the answer has been negative, since the applicability of the sanctions has not been 
within the legitimate expectations of the parties and the parties cannot be deemed to have 
chosen the subsequently imposed sanction to apply.238 The issue is, however, essentially a 
question of interpreting the choice of law provision by the parties and the answer hence 
                                                 
236  Here, a meticulous reader is able to observe a dichotomy corresponding to the different schools or 
conceptions of the origin of arbitration discussed in chapter 1.3 above. The transnational public policy method 
(chapter 4.3) obviously puts more value on the autonomous base of arbitration's nature, since it explicitly 
distances itself from national laws and their conceptions of public policy and creates an alternative body of 
public policy, the transnational public policy. The foreign mandatory rules method (chapter 4.5) on the other 
hand emphasizes the jurisdictional nature of arbitration where the arbitrator should also ensure the compliance 
with states' interests. The strict application of lex causae, as well demonstrated by the method of indirect 
application (chapter 4.4) finally may be seen as a display of the contractualist school of thought. 
237Born 2014, p. 2707; Burdeau 2003, p. 770 and Derains 1986, pp. 244–245. Some have, however, suggested 
that the mandatory rules of lex causae should face the same scrutiny as all other mandatory rules since that 
way the public policies of that state would gain unwarranted precedence over other the public policies of other 
states. See Voser 1996, pp. 339–340. Most, however, seem to agree that by choosing the applicable law to their 
contract, the parties agree that all of its mandatory provisions may also come to apply. See the discussion and 
criticism of Voser's views in Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp. 219–222. 
238 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 109–110. On determining the legitimate expectations of the parties, see Derains 
1986. 
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depends on the particulars of each case.239 In many instances it may nonetheless be argued 
that the trade sanction in the applicable law must be assimilated to foreign trade sanctions to 
the extent the sanction has been promulgated after the conclusion of the contract between 
the parties since it was not the will of the parties' to have such sanction applied. As Azeredo 
da Silveira put it: 
This position is justifiable considering that had the parties known that the 
applicable law would encompass provisions serving public interests, they might 
have selected another law, in which case the said provisions could only have 
been given effect had they satisfied the conditions that must be met by an 
overriding mandatory rule that is external to the applicable law.240 
Therefore, given that the interpretation of the choice of law by parties that allows, the general 
presupposition should be that the subsequent trade sanctions in the law applicable to the 
parties' contract must be treated like the mandatory rules of other countries. Their 
applicability is therefore determined by means of the same standards, described below and 
only if those standards are met, can the trade sanction be considered a part of the applicable 
law. In most cases, however, trade sanctions will be considered through the concept of force 
majeure, or alike in the applicable law.241 Hence, the divide between the two views, one 
promoting the automatic application of mandatory rules of lex causae and the other requiring 
them to observe the same prerequisites as mandatory rules of other countries, is not as steep 
as it first seems. Nonetheless, what is below said about foreign mandatory rules, will also 
have to be extended to the mandatory rules of the lex causae. 
 Transnational public policy 
4.3.1 Definitions and preliminary remarks 
In the judicial system of private international law, i.e. in international disputes heard before 
national courts, the applicable law typically provides a public policy provision to ensure 
compliance of the judgment with the most essential rules of the forum.242 Since arbitration 
                                                 
239 Born 2014, p. 2708. 
240 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 81. 
241 See chapter 4.4 below. 
242 See i.a. Article 21 Rome I Regulation. 
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strictly speaking has no forum or lex fori, the compatibility assessment with any state's public 
policies as such does not come into question. To ensure compliance with certain principles 
of morality and justice, arbitral literature and case law has come up with a notion of 
transnational public policy that may be used to reject outcomes that are not in line with 
fundamental moral or ethical principles. 
Transnational, or truly international public policy,243 is a limited category of public policy 
applied in international arbitration that reflects the transnationally held conceptions of justice 
and principles of law. A notion very similar to that of transnational public policy has, at least 
implicitly, been referred to in judicial practice as early as in the 1940's244 but the notion was 
best fostered and brought to common knowledge by Pierre Lalive in his 1986 article "Ordre 
Public Transnational (ou Réellement International) Et Arbitrage International" and and has 
since earned almost unanimous acceptance with practitioners.245 Even if the existence of 
such a category of public policy is not disputed, the scope and contents of transnational 
public policy are very much debated. 
Early descriptions have characterized transnational public policy as a “general principle of 
law recognized by civilized nations that contracts which seriously violate bonos mores or 
international public policy are invalid or at least unenforceable and that they cannot be 
sanctioned by courts or arbitrators”.246 The ILA Interim Report describes transnational 
public policy as "representing an international consensus as to universal standards and 
accepted norms of conduct that must always apply" and comprising "fundamental rules of 
natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in public international law, and the 
general principles of morality accepted by what are referred to as “civilised nations”.247 
One author has referred to it as the lowest common denominator of all legal systems of the 
world.248 Transnational public policy is hence not the public policy of any state in particular 
but rather public policy that transcends state boundaries and reflects universal or at least very 
                                                 
243 Also simply known as international public policy (e.g. Born 2014, pp. 2117–2119) or in French as ordre 
public réellement/veritablement international (e.g. Goldman 1963, p. 432). 
244 For the judicial basis and history of the notion of transnational public policy in international arbitration, see 
Lalive 1987, pp. 187–200.  
245 Blessing 1999, p. 62 and Matray 1997, p. 86. 
246 ICC Award 1110 p. 10. 
247 ILA Interim Report, pp. 2–3 and 7. 
248 Hobér 2011, p. 57.  
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widely accepted values and morals.249 Like the national conception of public policy, the 
notion of transnational public policy escapes any fixed definition by its nature; it is 
constantly evolving and developing with the evolution of international trade and its contents 
are determined on a case-by-case basis.250 Blessing has described the innate difficulty of 
determining the contents of transnational public policy as follows: 
"One is somehow tempted to say that this phenomenon is somehow akin to the 
difficulty to define an elephant: You may say that an elephant is grey and big, 
and yet, this definition is neither helpful nor informative. But, nevertheless, when 
you see an elephant, you can immediately recognize it as such."251 
It is indeed tempting to pass over the trouble of defining the elephant this way. Leaving the 
definition and application of a notion as intrusive as transnational public policy only to the 
hands of the arbitrators, however, risks the interpretation to lead to the application of 
artifacted policy created by the arbitrators for that particular case252. Some criteria should 
hence be applied to reveal the contents of the notion.  
Legal literature has painted some kind of consensus on the fact that at least prohibitions of 
corruption, smuggling, drug traffic, and the export of goods belonging to the cultural heritage 
would constitute transnational public policy.253 Procedural principles such as fair hearing 
and due process have also been said to form a part of this set of transnational moral values.254 
The transnational public policy should not, however, be conceived as a set list of rules, but 
rather as a method, aimed at ousting morally insupportable outcomes in arbitration 
proceedings. The method should not be based on the intuition of the arbitrator in, but rather 
on some more or less objective criteria. As will be noted below, the criteria may quite often 
                                                 
249 Pryles 2007, p. 3. Requiring a comprehensive, totally universal adoption of certain policies for them to 
constitute transnational public policy is of course not reasonable, as certain rogue states do not recognize even 
some very fundamental values and morals.  
250 Marchand 2012, p. 101 and Brunner 2008, p. 275. 
251 Blessing 1999, p. 62. See also Lazareff 1995, p. 141, stating that experienced arbitrators immediately know 
when transnational public policy is in play. 
252 Reisman 2007, p. 850. 
253 ILA Interim Report p. 7; von Hoffmann 1997, p. 23 and Lalive 1987, pp. 258–318.  
254 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 218. 
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be derived from states' international obligations, i.e. public international law. 255  The 
suggested method and the relevant criteria are presented below. 
4.3.2 Application-worthiness test  
Determining when a public policy is so commanding that it becomes truly international, or 
transnational, able to oust the parties' choice of law, including national public policies, is a 
persistent dilemma that cannot be answered unambiguously. The dilemma may be 
disentangled, or at least better dismantled, by means of the so called application-worthiness 
test: by examining the public policy's financial or socio-economic goals and underlying 
policies, examined under a functional analysis.256 This method of exercising discretion over 
transnational public policy rules has traditionally been used in relation to the special 
connection method, discussed below, but may equally well be used to assess the 
transnational public policy rules. 257  At least three matters should be considered in 
determining the application-worthiness of a given rule: The first one is the so-called shared-
values-test, determining whether the protected value is of essential character and reflecting 
fundamental principles of transnational public policy. Secondly, the wide applicability of the 
rule, proving that the rule truly is transnationally shared, could serve as an indicator of the 
application-worthiness of the contemplated transnational public policy rule. Finally, one 
should consider whether the outcome of applying such public policy is, all things 
considering, appropriate. 
The application-worthiness test and its first branch, the shared-values test, is effectively an 
examination of the underlying purposes and goals of the trade sanction or some other 
mandatory rule. For this purpose, the rules of public international law offer an excellent 
yardstick and most notably a set of tools for avoiding a situation where the arbitrator would 
have to resort to mere personal moral assessment of the facts.258 The supra-national nature 
of the notion of transnational public policy requires it to be based on the opinion of the 
                                                 
255 See Gaillard – Savage 1999, p. 853. 
256 Blessing 1999, p. 64; Brunner 2008, p. 274 and Grigera Naón 2001, p. 320. Blessing also lists six other 
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257 Waincymer 2009, p. 36. on foreign mandatory rules method, see chapter 4.5.4 below. 
258 Lalive 1987, pp. 284–286 and Grigera Naón 2001, pp. 322–323. 
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collective of nations, and since public international law inarguably has a notable role in 
defining the opinions of the collective of nations, it should indeed be given weight in the 
assessment. Widely accepted treaties and conventions could form a solid starting point for 
assessing the acceptability of certain public policies.259   
The position of public international law, the law of nations, as a source for rules of 
transnational public policy is virtually undisputed in literature.260 Some have even gone as 
far as stating that transnational public policy could form a part of public international law, 
and not vice versa.261 However, since rules of public international law are not unambiguous 
and often contradict with each other, single rules of international law may rarely as such be 
used to legitimize the transnational public policy status of a mandatory rule or a fundamental 
principle. Public international law, however, provides also the tools for balancing the 
differing interests when contemplating the transnational public policy status of a given trade 
sanction or other rule or principle of law. Besides public international law, arbitral and court 
practice may provide tools for finding and measuring those values that have been deemed as 
fundamentally important in the practice of international commerce.262 
The direct applicability of rules of public international law has also raised some questions.263 
Public international law by definition concerns states and their interests, and as a general 
rule, is not intended to directly influence the relationships between private individuals.264 
Extending its effect to relationships between private individuals is an exception to this main 
rule. It has, however, been widely accepted that public international law and especially 
UNSC multilateral sanctions, instruments of public international law in themselves, may 
affect the contents of transnational public policy as well as the national public policies of 
                                                 
259 Marchand 2012, p. 188. 
260 Lalive 1987, pp. 307–308; Marchand 2012, pp. 98–99 and Racine 2004, p. 105. See also the ILA 
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261 Von Hoffmann 1997, p. 23. 
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263 Matray 1997, p. 73. 
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states.265 The rules of public international law are thus not directly applied, but rather used 
as a yardstick to measure what constitutes internationally held morals and values.  
The second branch of determining whether a rule is applicable as transnational public policy 
is defining when a rule is sufficiently universally accepted. The mere fact that a certain 
legislative solution has been adopted by a large number of states does not in itself make it 
transnational public policy. It is generally held that states should be left with the possibility 
to adopt their own legislative solutions as long as they are not expressly against principles 
of public international law.266 Therefore, merely following a certain legislative solution 
because it has been adopted by number of countries does not seem tenable. However, wide 
acceptance should be an imperative precondition for a certain rule to constitute transnational 
public policy.267This further underlines the fact that widely accepted and ratified treaties 
should form a solid starting point for unveiling the contents of transnational public policy. 
Finally, the application of transnational public policy rules should lead to an appropriate 
result that is acceptable and truly protects the interests it aims. Therefore, if applying a trade 
sanction as a rule of transnational public policy would not prevent the performance of the 
contract and if applying it would cause a disproportionate risk of penal or financial sanctions, 
such as losses of export licenses, the application of such trade sanction cannot be deemed 
appropriate.268 
4.3.3 Multilateral trade sanctions 
Multilateral trade sanctions, issued by UNSC Resolutions serve as a prime example on how 
rules of public international law may affect the contents of transnational public policy. 
Multilateral sanctions' position as rules of transnational public policy enjoys virtually 
                                                 
265  Regarding national public policies, see ILA Recommendations p. 3 stating that states' international 
obligations may form a part of its public policy. As regards transnational public policy, see Grelon – Gudin 
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universal acceptance among practitioners because of the fact that they are quasi-universally 
accepted within the international community, and they as such form a part of the law of 
nations.269 Resolutions of the UNSC will have to, by their nature as unanimous decisions of 
the international community, reflect the values of the international community. Hence it is 
very widely accepted that that UNSC trade sanction may be applied as a matter of 
transnational public policy despite a contrary choice of law by the parties, even if the country 
of lex causae has not implemented the sanction in question into their national legislation.270 
Therefore, multilateral trade sanctions have typically been regarded as forming a part of the 
positive transnational public policy, directly applicable in the parties' dispute, even if not 
part of the applicable law.271  
However, even multilateral sanctions issued by the UNSC have been subjected to a review 
by national, or in this case EU courts. In the well-known Kadi rulings, the CJEU deemed 
that it was empowered to review the lawfulness of the EU implementing measures of UNSC 
sanction resolutions with regard to certain fundamental values shared by the UN and the 
EU.272 Although an arbitral tribunal should not as a general rule be empowered to review 
UNSC decisions, the above serves to demonstrate that even the most widely accepted norms 
may not be taken as absolute norms of public international law and transnational public 
policy.273 Therefore again, transnational public policy may not be conceived as a static list 
of norms, supported by law of nations. Rather, the contents of transnational public policy are 
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better uncovered through the described method of transnational public policy used to 
determine whether the transnational public policy has a valid claim to oust the national rules. 
This happens through the application worthiness test: by assessing the relative weight 
between the values and limitation to rights underlying behind the conflicting norms and 
finally by choosing the result that best balances the interests.  
Multilateral sanctions presumptively serve universally held interests and the UNSC must be 
considered to have weighed the interests and deemed that the interest protected by the 
sanction is so essential that it should prevail over the will of the parties and the protection of 
their property. The above also serves to prove that the issues of transnational public policy 
and their collision with national public policies are fundamentally questions of morality and 
personal values. For the assessment of morality, public international law provides at least a 
seemingly objective benchmark.  
4.3.4 Unilateral trade sanctions  
It could be asked to what extent could the question of other types of trade sanctions, i.e. 
unilateral trade sanctions, also be considered through the prism of transnational public 
policies and the application-worthiness test. The UNSC Resolutions imposing trade 
sanctions are an exceptional case since they constitute rules of international law in 
themselves, imposing themselves over the parties as transnational public policy rules. 
Unilateral sanctions, issued autonomously by states or supranational entities such as the EU, 
do not as a general rule qualify as rules of transnational public policy since they do not 
presumptively constitute rules of public international law or otherwise reflect the 
fundamental principles of laws of "civilized nations". One could however pose a question 
whether a unilateral sanction that would not originate from the UN but that would 
nonetheless be accepted and shared by a vast majority of nations could constitute 
transnational public policy. Although possible, such scenario seems unlikely. Some writers 
assert that ules of transnational public policy may in exceptional circumstances be used to 
further the national public policies of one state over another.274 One could for example 
imagine a situation where a permanent member of the UNSC would be subjected to almost 
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universally accepted unilateral sanctions. Permanent members of the UNSC enjoy a veto 
power over all UNSC Resolutions, and thus may veto multilateral trade sanctions aimed 
against them.275 In such situation, the UNGA could also pass recommendations to issue 
sanctions against this country, condemning its actions and even recommending the issuance 
of sanctions.276 Even if this were the case, the threshold for degree of universality and 
acceptance among member states would in every case have to be set very high and the 
condemnation for the actions that lead to the sanctions would have to be virtually 
universal.277 Arbitrators should remain impartial over the parties and their countries of origin 
and in every case avoid politicizing the questions they are ruling on. Deeming a trade 
sanction to constitute transnational public policy on overtly lenient grounds would easily 
constitute a breach of the arbitrators' impartiality. 278 
Voser has discussed this type of rules under the denomination of universally recognized 
legally protected interests. According to Voser these interests are somewhat of a corollary 
to transnational public policy, yet lacking transnational public policy status as such and thus 
discussed in relation to the special connection method, discussed below. The category 
includes certain interests that are shared universally, whose existence may be indicated by 
similar laws implemented in other states.279 If a unilateral trade sanction were shared by a 
large number of states, and implemented because of a valid cause, say promotion of peace 
or human rights, one could be tempted to conclude that this type of sanction could constitute 
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such universally recognized interest that could be taken into account as a foreign mandatory 
rule. Given the absence of a UNSC Resolution the threshold for considering a unilateral 
sanction transnational public policy would, however, in every case have to be set extremely 
high. 
Transnational public policy may nonetheless have an effect in cases where the arbitral 
tribunal contemplates whether to refuse application of a unilateral trade sanction, applicable 
under the lex causae. This could be the case when the unilateral sanctions would contravene 
with transnational public policies, being in conflict with certain universal conceptions of 
morality. A clash between a unilateral trade sanction, a domestic public policy on one hand 
and transnational public policy on the other will as a general rule have to be resolved in the 
favor of the latter.280  
The transnational public policy as such has indeed a negative effect as well as a positive one 
and it may be used to supersede provisions of law that are in contradiction with it and public 
international law.281 Some early commentators and treaties have even held that all unilateral 
measures taken for the purposes of foreign policy or national security would always be 
contrary to the rules of public international law, since they would run counter to the principle 
of non-intervention as set out in Article 2(3) UNC. If one were to strictly follow this line of 
interpretation, all unilateral trade sanctions should be disregarded by the arbitrator on a 
transnational public policy basis. The current prevailing view however is, that no clear rule 
of customary international law exists prohibiting the use of unilateral trade sanctions 
exists.282 The International Court of Justice, the primary judicial branch of the UN, has in 
fact specifically stated that unilateral economic measures do not as such breach international 
law.283 It therefore seems clear that transnational public policy cannot be used to supersede 
all cases where unilateral trade sanctions could become applicable.  
It has been nonetheless argued that transnational public policy could be used to supersede a 
unilateral trade sanction in the lex causae if the sanction is i.a. racially or religiously 
                                                 
280 Lalive 1987, p. 312 and Marchand 2012, pp. 188–189. 
281 Lalive 1987, p. 312. 
282 Lowenfeld 2002, p. 732  
283 International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua,, paragraph 
245. 
 65 
discriminating.284 Here, the general principles of non-discrimination, as they are embodied 
in international treaties and human rights conventions, as well as a universal principle of 
morality and comity between nations, could be used to oppose the application of 
discriminatory sanctions. In this way, the arbitrator should assess in which way the 
application or non-application would affect the third party rights by means of unjustified 
discrimination, and then balance the limitation on third-party rights with the effect the 
legitimate expectations of the parties to have their dispute resolved predictable in accordance 
with the lex causae.285 The difficulty, however, lies in distinguishing such racist embargo 
from a purely political one. 286  For example some human rights conventions prohibit 
discrimination based on nationality. Should all such trade sanctions and boycotts that are 
based on nationality be considered contrary to transnational public policy based on the fact 
that they discriminate people based on a personal reason such as nationality? Such solution 
seems untenable. In Götaverken, the arbitral tribunal implicitly concluded that the 
contractual requirement to respect the nationality based boycott laws against Israel and to 
provide a certificate that no parts of the provided goods were of Israeli origin was not as 
such against principles of transnational public policy.287 Indeed, misinterpreting a political 
trade sanction for a racist one would make the arbitrator to take a stand on the political rather 
than legal or even ethical issues. Despite these difficulties, the arbitrator should pay special 
attention when assessing the applicability of racially or religiously motivated sanctions, as 
not to feed morally insupportable activities, which as a general rule are against the principles 
of transnational public policy. 
It has further been asserted that the freedom of trade and principle of non-intervention, as 
protected in the international treaties and human rights conventions, could constitute such 
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fundamental principle of public international law and transnational public policy that could 
justify the non-application of certain unilateral trade sanctions.288 Besides the principle of 
non-intervention of the UNC discussed above, i.a. the Article 2(1) UNC on the sovereignty 
all nations, Article XI GATT 289  on the elimination of quantitative restrictions or the 
principles of non-discrimination as embodied in numerous human rights conventions290 
could be used to prove that a trade sanction would be contrary to the rules of public 
international law and thus transnational public policy.291 The trade sanctions restricting trade 
and breaching above rules of international law are nonetheless not as such contrary to 
transnational public policy, solely based on the existence of the said rules of international 
law.292 In fact, the public international law arguments may also feed the counter-arguments 
in favor of the application of the unilateral trade sanction: Articles XXI(b)–(c) GATT 
provide for an exception that in certain cases allows derogation from the rules of elimination 
of quantitative restrictions293 and human rights may legitimately be restricted or balanced 
against other human rights.  
A special case in the transnational public policy assessment of unilateral trade sanctions, and 
a corollary with the case of UNSC multilateral sanctions, is a situation where the UNGA has 
explicitly condemned a unilateral sanction.294 In these cases the unilateral sanction in the 
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applicable law should presumptively be non-legitimate and against the transnational public 
policy, in a way similar to the fact that multilateral sanctions presumptively form 
transnational public policy. Like in the case of multilateral sanction, in cases relating to the 
non-applicability of unilateral sanction, the presumption may in principle also be overturned.  
In every case, however, following the application-worthiness test described above, the 
arbitrator will also have to consider whether the value protected by the transnational public 
policy that is used to oust the rule in the otherwise applicable law is sufficiently widely 
shared. If after balancing the interests and after ascertaining that the rule is universally 
shared, the protected interest appears legitimate and sufficiently widely shared, the arbitrator 
must further consider whether the result, all things considering, is appropriate and 
satisfactory. For example, the arbitrator must consider whether the possible non-application 
of a sanction would lead to enforceability problems, and further, consider how the result 
would affect the contractual balance and estimate whether changes in the contractual balance 
are justified.295 If the non-application of a sanction in lex causae alters the contractual 
balance in a fundamental manner that does not seem justified considering the gravity of the 
protected third party interests, the arbitrator should apply the unilateral sanction.296 Just as 
was the case of the public policy control at the stage of setting aside and enforcement, here 
too the transnational public policy analysis should happen on the level of outcomes. If the 
outcome of applying a sanction in the lex causae would breach principles of public 
international law or transnational public policy, only then should the application be denied. 
In most cases concerning unilateral trade sanctions of the lex causae, it is hard to visualize 
such negative externalities that would justify deviating from the parties will.297 The arbitrator 
is often unable to render an award that would evade the negative third party effects, since in 
many cases the performance of the contract has become impossible regardless whether the 
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rule constituting the public policy rule is applied as transnational public policy or not. If the 
externalities, such as limitations of free trade or discriminating on an inappropriate basis 
cannot be evaded, it is better to obey the parties’ will and render an award that is in 
accordance with the applicable law and thus the parties' expectations. 
Having concluded this brief analysis of transnational public policies, a follow-up question 
that is tightly linked with the theory of transnational public policies must be asked. It regards 
the manner in which public policy issues are considered in arbitral tribunals. The issue 
whether trade sanctions should be applied as foreign mandatory rules, or alternatively only 
taken into account as impediments to the performance of the contract under the otherwise 
applicable law, must be answered in order to examine the issues of foreign mandatory rules 
and their relation with the transnational public policy exception. The question must also be 
answered to understand how transnational public policies are given effect: whether rules of 
transnational public policy are deviations from the otherwise applicable law merely 
impediments or grounds for nullity under it. The underlying issue could also be formulated 
as to whether the issues of foreign trade sanctions should be considered at the level of private 
international law, as choice of law issues, or rather only by treating them as mere contractual 
issues under the otherwise applicable law. This is discussed below. 
 Direct or indirect application of trade sanctions 
The traditional view with regard to all foreign mandatory rules, prevailing until the latter 
part of the 20th century has been that prohibitions under a law foreign to lex causae should 
be treated merely as impediments under the otherwise applicable law.298 Even some notable 
contemporary authors hold that no mandatory rules foreign to the lex causae should ever be 
applied, and that such rules may only be taken into account as factual elements in the 
otherwise applicable law.299 How does one then take rules into account as factual elements? 
The arbitrator may, under the applicable law, assert that the performance of the contract has 
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become impossible300 or that their contract has become void, since it is illegal to have 
concluded such contract in the first place. Under this type of strict datum approach, the so-
called indirect mode of application, the foreign trade sanctions' (or any other mandatory 
rules') legal and statutory nature is disregarded by the arbitrators and the sanction is regarded 
as a mere factual circumstance under the otherwise applicable law.301 In this manner, the 
arbitrator will not have to resort to a choice of law analysis. For example the transnational 
public policies, discussed above, are often given effect in this manner, without directly 
applying them but merely giving them effect under the lex causae and by considering them 
as impediments to the performance of the contract or as grounds for the nullity thereof.302 
A considerable number of authors however assert that there are a number of situations where 
foreign mandatory rules should be applied as rules of law and not merely as facts under the 
otherwise applicable law. They hence leave open the possibility that some rules could be 
considered as foreign mandatory rules that may truly be applied and affect the parties' choice 
of law. Indeed, most contemporary arbitrators as well as judges seem to agree that that they 
have the power and sometimes even the duty to apply foreign mandatory rules as legal issues, 
i.e. as public policy rules. Also arbitral literature exhibits that today mandatory rules may 
indeed be directly applied in arbitral tribunals.303 Certain authors also state that also trade 
sanctions should be interpreted just like all other foreign mandatory rules, through the prism 
of private international law, by considering them as foreign mandatory rules.304 
In relation to trade sanctions, however, a significant majority of authors and relevant case 
law would seem to promote the method of indirect application, the datum approach. Some 
have argued that trade sanctions constitute in this respect a special case in the universe of 
public policy rules due to their indirect mode of application.305 The reason why many people 
tend to support the indirect application trade sanctions is, however, simple: unlike some other 
mandatory rules, such as competition laws, trade sanctions often render the performance of 
                                                 
300 In such scenario, the mandatory rule forms an event of force majeure, frustration, or hardship (hereinafter 
for the sake of simplicity referred to only as force majeure). 
301 Azeredo da Sileveira 2014, p. 36 and van Hecke 1984–1985, p. 116.  
302 See e.g. the ICC Award 1110 where the public policy exception was said to function through the invalidity 
or unenforceability of the parties’ contract. 
303 See chapter 4.5.2 below. 
304 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 35–64. 
305 Schäfer et al. 2005, p. 88. 
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the contract straight out impossible. If the place where the seller's goods are located 
implements an export prohibition, this can relatively easily be interpreted through the force 
majeure exception, as an impediment to the performance of the contract. For example the 
fact that the parties' distribution agreement would breach antitrust laws is not as easily 
discussed through the notion of force majeure in the lex causae.  
If one is to follow the datum approach, foreign mandatory rules may be considered as a 
factual elements in the otherwise applicable law, by means of: 
1. Causing nullity of the parties' contract, due to immorality or contravention 
with public policy; or 
2. Causing unenforceability of the contract by constituting a force majeure 
situation under the otherwise applicable law.306 
If one decides to consider foreign trade sanctions as factual elements in the parties' contract, 
the nullity of the underlying contract may normally ensue only when such trade sanctions or 
other mandatory rules have already been in force at the time of the conclusion of the contract 
and the contract has been knowingly concluded in breach of the prohibition.307  In this 
manner, if the parties had concluded a contract an essential purpose of which is to breach the 
sanctions legislation of the lex causae, the parties’ contract could be deemed immoral under 
the laws applicable to the parties’ contract.308 It may also be that the wording of the sanction 
                                                 
306 Brunner 2008, pp. 245–246; van Hecke 1984–1985, p. 115 and van Houtte 1988, pp. 143–147.  
307 I.e. in cases of antecedent trade sanctions. See Van Houtte 1988, p. 143 and Brunner 2008, p. 245. Some 
commentators have also suggested that certain trade sanctions issued by the UNSC could lead to the nullity of 
the underlying contract not only in relation to contracts entered into after the implementation of the trade 
sanction but also to those contracts that have already existed at the time of the introduction of the sanction. 
Whether or not nullity would ensue would depend on the wording of the sanction's text and whether or not it 
provides for retroactive effect. See Brunner 2008, pp. 245–246 and Burdeau 2003, p. 769, who states that it 
could be imaginable that a UNSC resolution could in cases of certain arms embargoes be worded so that it 
would lead to the nullity of even existing agreements. So far, however, almost all existing trade sanctions have 
been worded so that no retroactive effect should be attributed to them. See Burdeau 2001 pp. 273–274 and 
Burdeau 2003, p. 769. For an example of a rare embargo decree where retroactive effect was ordered, see 
Matray 1997, p. 93 and the referred Italian Government Decree dated 15 April 1967. 
308 Under Finnish law, it is generally held that contracts where one of the parties has pledged itself to commit 
a crime are not valid (Finnish: pätemätön). (Hemmo 2007, p. 437). As noted above, breaching trade sanctions 
has been criminalized in Chapter 46 Criminal Act and such contracts could hence be deemed invalid if a 
contract whose main purpose was to breach a sanction was entered into after the imposition of such sanction. 
Further, it could be imagined that pledging to breach a blocking statute could also lead to the invalidity of the 
underlying agreement as such activity is sanctioned with fine under law (Section 3 Blocking Statute Act) and 
breaches of mandatory law as a general rule have been deemed to lead to invalidity of the contract (Hemmo 
2007, pp. 436–437). 
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itself would call for the invalidity of the contract.309 Similarly, if the parties have entered 
into a contract to breach transnational public policy rules such as multilateral trade sanctions, 
the arbitrator could, based on transnational public policy considerations, deem such contract 
invalid ab initio.310 Mandatory rules besides those of lex causae and of transnational public 
policy should not generally affect the validity of the parties’ contract, even if in force at the 
moment of the conclusion of the parties contract, but may be considered through the other 
side of the datum approach, the force majeure exception, as initial legal impediments.311 
The second and more probably notable category of cases where foreign rules could be given 
effect as facts under the otherwise applicable law is the situation where the sanction 
constitutes a force majeure situation. Here, the rule can generally be given effect by 
arbitrators under the following conditions: 
1. The non-application of this rule would make performance of the contract impossible;  
2. The event constituting force majeure indeed was not foreseeable; and 
3. The force majeure event was not provided for in the parties' contract and was 
otherwise exterior to the parties.312  
Under this force majeure approach, all public policy rules, domestic or foreign, resulting in 
impossibility in the performance of the contact, and meeting the criteria of unforeseeability 
and exteriority, e.g. all efficient trade sanctions, would be considered as force majeure events 
whose effect would be assessed based on the lex causae and the lex causae alone. Under the 
conception it is not the foreign law as such but rather the fact that it makes the contractual 
performance impossible that can be considered the force majeure event.313 Normally, the 
force majeure event would constitute a factual hurdle to the performance of the contract.314  
                                                 
309 Brunner 2008, p. 244. 
310 Brunner 2008, pp. 245–246. 
311 Brunner 2008, p. 242. 
312 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 14; Blessing 1997, pp. 33–34 and Marchand 2012, pp. 272-299. These 
preconditions may be found in most force majeure clauses, see i.a. ICC Force Majeure Clause 2003 and force 
majeure provisions in sale of goods laws, e.g. Article 79(1) United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, adopted on 11 April 1980 in Vienna (“CISG”); Article 7.1.7 UNIDROIT Principles 
2010 and Section 27(1) Finnish Sale of Goods Act (Kauppalaki, 355/1987). 
313 Hochstrasser 1994, p. 72. 
314 See i.a. ICC Awards 4462 and 5864 from where American embargo measures against Libya were taken into 
consideration in a dispute between American and Libyan parties, under the force majeure exception in a Libyan 
law contract. See further the award by Chamber of Arbitration of Milan (Chamber of National and International 
Arbitration of Milan, final award of 20 July 1992, no. 1491), where trade sanctions against Iraq, issued by Italy 
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The acceptability of non-performance due to a trade sanction would hence be assessed based 
on a force majeure provision in the applicable law or based on a similar provision in the 
parties' contract which would then be interpreted in accordance with the lex causae. The 
interpretation of force majeure provisions in different legal systems and under different 
national laws may differ drastically and considering the relevant clause under lex causae, 
rather than under the law proper of the sanction could in some cases lead to significantly 
different results.315  
The criteria of impossibility can be deemed fulfilled even in cases of extraterritorial 
sanctions, where the performance of contract would not be factually impeded by the 
sanction. The party facing the sanctions could nonetheless face a risk of a penalty, e.g. a 
governmental punishment, such as a criminal sanction, that one should not be expected to 
face, or alternatively the performance of the contract could for some other reason become 
economically so unreasonable or unaffordable, as to render the performance of the contract 
factually impossible. These risks may in many cases as such constitute impossibility and an 
event of force majeure.316 Hence, no physical impossibility of performance is required for 
the force majeure provision to have effect but the sanction would naturally need to fulfill the 
criteria of force majeure under the otherwise applicable law.317  
Advocates of both direct as well as indirect application would seem to agree that 
transnational public policy may affect the parties’ choice of law and that transnational public 
policies should normally merely be given effect under the otherwise applicable law.318 The 
datum approach should thus be the favored method when it comes to issues of transnational 
                                                 
and the EU, were considered as an impediment to the performance of an Iraqi law contract between Italian and 
Iraqi parties. 
315 Matray 1997, p. 77. 
316 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 47; Hochstrasser 1994, p. 72 and Marchand 2012, p. 230. For an analysis of 
requirement of impossibility under CISG see i.a. Brunner 2008, pp. 212–213. 
317 It is thus the lex causae under which the parties will assess the material effect of the sanctions. This would 
equally be the case even if the arbitrator would choose to determine the applicability of the trade sanction based 
on the theory of foreign mandatory rules, discussed below. Even if one were to follow the foreign mandatory 
rules theory, the approach would still only govern the question of whether the sanction could be taken into 
account when resolving the parties’ dispute. The choice of law issue would thus constitute only one additional 
step in determining how the sanction may affect the parties’ relationship. The material questions will in every 
case be determined on the basis of lex causae. See also Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 191–192. 
318 See Brunner 2008, pp. 273–274 for an advocate of indirect application and Azeredo da Sileveira 2014, pp. 
62–64 for supporter of direct application. 
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public policy. What sets the two sides apart is their position in relation to prohibitions that 
do not converge with transnational public policy.  
Some have, in fact, gone as far as stating that the application of trade sanctions as a factual 
circumstance is non-controversial.319 However, even if most writers would seem to share the 
view of applying trade sanctions as facts320, it could be seen as an overstatement to call such 
application non-controversial. Legal literature does not present a unanimous picture321 and 
at least some court practice illustrates that at times sanctions are indeed applied as factual 
circumstances322, but at other times as foreign mandatory rules323. In fact, a party who wishes 
to invoke a trade sanction often does so by invoking both force majeure situation under the 
otherwise applicable law and by invoking the sanction as a foreign mandatory rule.324 Hence, 
as direct application of trade sanctions as foreign mandatory rules seems to be accepted at 
least in part, it would be careless to disregard such application altogether.  
The benefits of the force majeure approach have also been criticized, even if considering 
trade sanctions as mere factual circumstances avoided the troublesome choice of law 
problems posed by application of foreign mandatory rules. It has been asserted that it is 
arbitrary and an unsatisfactory shortcut to favor the laws of one country by a way of 
dissociating the factual circumstances created by a trade sanction from its nature as a 
politically directed legal rule merely because certain sanctions happen to be effective or not 
effective.325 It should be noted, however, that the arbitrator has no other choice than to apply 
or to not apply the rules as mandatory rules. Therefore, the arbitrator will in any case have 
                                                 
319 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 14; see also Waincymer 2012, p. 1017. 
320 See Brunner 2008, pp. 272–273; Mayer 1986, pp. 291–292 and Voser 1996, pp. 353–354. 
321 On application as foreign mandatory rules, see i.a. Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 127–190 and van Houtte 
1997, pp. 167–168. 
322 See footnote 314 and ICC Awards 2216 and 3881, SCC Award V0007/2008 and the award in AAA 
arbitration between Northrop Corporation and Triad International Marketing SA, reported in U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California - 593 F. Supp. 928. 
323 See at least the judgment in the Sensor (District Court at the The Hague 17 September 1982) dispute where 
a Dutch court considered American export prohibitions under article 7(1) Rome Convention (discussed in 
chapter 4.5.4 below) in connection with delivery of pipeline technology from Netherlands to the USSR under 
the Dutch law.  
324 See i.a. the SCC Award V007/2008 in Naftogaz v IUGAS, rendered 19 October 2010, where failure to attain 
export license (i.e. not trade sanctions stricto sensu) was invoked as both foreign mandatory rules and force 
majeure events. 
325 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 47–48. 
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to favor the laws of one country and the general presumption should be to apply the rules of 
law chosen by the parties. 
It has also been argued, that if sanctions were to be considered strictly as factual 
circumstances, the arbitrators would be compelled to apply the sanctions in every case where 
the sanction would provide any factual hurdle to the performance of the contract. This would 
mean that an arbitrator would have to lend a hand to one State in its attempt to isolate 
financially and commercially another no matter what the underlying rationale behind the 
sanction, or its connection to the parties and their contract was.326 The arbitrator could thus 
be forced to enforce a sanction whose claim lacked legitimacy. It may be asked, however, 
what are such legitimate grounds for refusing to apply a foreign trade sanction that do not 
fall into the category of transnational public policy? If the prohibition aims to promote a goal 
that is completely morally unsound it may be refused applicability based on transnational 
public policy. If the sanction is not morally unsound, it is hard to imagine a situation where 
the arbitrator should nonetheless apply the laws of one state over another, if the first does 
not represent a transnational consensus or the only morally legitimate view. Conversely it 
has also been argued that if a state were unable to enforce a prohibition, the arbitrator would 
be left with no other option than refusing to apply the prohibition, even if the prohibition had 
served a legitimate purpose.327 The same argumentation as above may be applied here. Why 
should an arbitrator, who has no lex fori, choose to apply a trade sanction if it does not form 
a part of the law proper of the contract or the transnational public policy? Morally unsound 
outcomes may be rebutted through the application of transnational public policy. If the 
prohibition on the other hand involves a risk of a criminal or administrative sanction, the 
arbitrator may take this risk into account when assessing the situation under the otherwise 
applicable law and its force majeure provisions or when assessing the legality of the contract 
under the otherwise applicable law. 
Considering trade sanctions as well as other impediments to the performance of the contract 
as factual circumstances, is an exception and a shortcut in the system of mandatory laws and 
                                                 
326 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 47–48. 
327 For an award where an export prohibition of a foreign country is disregarded, see the award by the Court of 
Arbitration of the German Coffee Association in Hamburg, dated 19 March 1987, where Colombian export 
prohibitions were not given effect under the otherwise applicable German law since Colombian authorities as 
a general rule did not enforce the prohibition to export coffee.  
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public policies. The exception is nonetheless well structured, its application being limited to 
situations where the performance of the contract is rendered impossible and where the 
sanction was unforeseeable and not provided for in the parties' agreement. The exception 
also provides generally consistent and relatively predicable outcomes and it is widely 
recognized by arbitral tribunals as well as national courts. Indeed, in a large majority of cases 
arbitrators seem to rely on the datum method.328 If a satisfactory and predictable result may 
be achieved without intervening the party autonomy and the chosen law, it may be asked 
what additional value is brought by considering such situations as foreign mandatory rules. 
Nevertheless, and as the court and arbitral practice do not present a unanimous picture, the 
following does not limit itself to considering trade sanctions' application as a mere factual 
circumstance under the otherwise applicable law, but also discusses trade sanctions as 
foreign mandatory rules to the extent necessary for understanding the legal situation and due 
to the fact that tools such as the special connection test may also be used in relation to indirect 
application of foreign mandatory rules. Further, the effect of the mandatory rules of the lex 
arbitri  ¸the place of arbitration, may not generally be discussed through the datum approach 
if the lex arbitri is external to the parties' dispute. In these cases, a sanction in the lex arbitri 
cannot render the performance of the parties' contract impossible, and cannot thus constitute 
an event of force majeure. There may still be a risk that its public policy provisions would 
render the award unenforceable in potential setting aside proceedings. There should, 
therefore, be some way for considering these issues. The general theory of application of 
foreign mandatory rules in arbitration proceedings, i.e. laws foreign to the lex causae is, 
however, a topic that has raised considerable amount of debate and would warrant a thesis 
in itself. The below thus only offers a brief excursion to the matters of foreign mandatory 
rules relating to the application of trade sanctions. 
 Trade sanctions and foreign mandatory rules 
4.5.1 General remarks 
Having concluded that arbitrators may also, in principle, consider trade sanctions as foreign 
mandatory rules, and not only as factual elements under the lex causae, the next question 
                                                 
328 See i.a. the cases in footnote 322 above. 
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must be, whether arbitrators are at all allowed to give foreign mandatory rules effect. If a 
trade sanction cannot be deemed to form transnational public policy and if the sanction is 
not embodied in the applicable law, does that mean that such trade sanction will have to be 
in every case disregarded by the arbitrator? What about cases where a unilateral trade 
sanction of a third country imposes itself over the parties and their contract? Can or even 
must these sanctions be taken into account, and if yes, in what way? As multilateral trade 
sanctions were mainly discussed in the previous subchapters, the following will not as a 
general rule discuss those categories of sanctions. 
To tackle the problem of foreign mandatory rules, three questions must be answered: 
1. May the arbitrator consider foreign mandatory rules? 
2. If yes, must he consider them? 
3. If yes, which mandatory rules should be considered?329 
These questions will be discussed in the following chapters so that the first two questions 
are discussed in chapter 4.5.2 and the third question in chapters 4.5.3 and 4.5.4. 
4.5.2 May or must an arbitrator consider foreign mandatory rules? 
As discussed above, some authors are highly skeptical of direct application of foreign 
mandatory rules and assert that the application of transnational public policy should suffice 
to rebut inequitable outcomes330, whereas most consider such application allowed, some 
even obligatory331. Arbitral case law would also seem favorable to the latter view: a large 
number of arbitral awards seem to prove that arbitrators indeed are allowed to apply foreign 
mandatory rules, even if they do not form transnational public policy.332 National judiciaries 
have also confirmed that matters involving foreign mandatory rules are arbitrable and that 
arbitrators, as a matter of principle, are allowed to apply the foreign mandatory rules.333 
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330 See Gaillard – Savage 1999, p. 855 and Hobér 2011, pp. 54–57. 
331 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp.  226–227; Blessing 1997, p. 23 and Born 2014, pp. 2712–2716. 
332 See i.a. ICC awards 16168, 14046, 8528, 6697, 6320 and 6294. 
333 Most notably, see the well-known Mitsubishi case (United States Supreme Court in 473 U.S. 614 (1985), 
(Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc), 02.07.1985) where the US Supreme Court 
concluded that matters pertaining to antitrust law could be subjected to arbitration and that, in accordance with 
the so-called second-look doctrine, the national judiciaries should be able to exercise certain level of control at 
the setting aside and enforcement proceedings. On arbitrability of trade sanctions issues, see chapter 2.4 above.  
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Further, a number of international resolutions and recommendations have also confirmed 
that foreign mandatory rules may as a general rule be applied in arbitral proceedings. For 
example the ILA334 and the Draft Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International 
Contracts 335  have come to the conclusion that arbitral tribunals have the power of 
considering foreign mandatory or public policy rules.336 Yet further, also the fact that an 
arbitrator having applied a rule outside the lex causae does not in itself render the award 
neither unenforceable under the New York Convention nor void under most national 
arbitration laws may be interpreted as in indirectly allowing the application of foreign 
mandatory rules.  
Additionally, if one were to look for analogy in the realm of private international law and 
international commercial litigation, similar tendencies may be conceived. A number of 
authors recognize the importance of certain private international law instruments, most 
notably the Rome Convention and their applicability to arbitral proceedings by analogy.337 
Also other private international law instruments seem to allow the consideration of foreign 
mandatory rules.338 According to Article 7(1) Rome Convention as well as Article 9(3) 
Rome I Regulation, effect may be given to the mandatory rules of the law of another country, 
given that certain criteria are met. If one accepts the analogous interpretation of the private 
international law instruments, it would seem clear that arbitrators are indeed, as a general 
rule, allowed to consider the foreign public policy rules they consider appropriate. As 
discussed above, some would nonetheless prefer not to apply any foreign rules at all. The 
possibility to apply such rules is however beyond doubt. 
A solution where all domestic and foreign mandatory rules would have to be applied by an 
arbitrator, irrespective what purpose they serve or what their connection to the dispute was, 
would in no way be sustainable or reasonable. 339  Therefore the question whether an 
                                                 
334 ILA Report and Recommendations on Ascertaining the Contents of the Applicable Law in International 
Arbitration 1991. 
335Article 11(2) Draft Hague Principles on the Choice of Law in International Contracts. 
336 See also the International Law Institute and International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) working group 
resolutions referred to by Born 2014, pp. 2714–2715. 
337 In relation to trade sanctions, see Azeredo da Silveira 2014, especially p. 112–117. In relation to public 
policy in general, see Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp. 228–233. 
338 See i.a. Article 9(3) Rome I regulation or Article 19 SPILA.  
339 Such solution would not respect party autonomy, would easily lead to unnecessary state legal expansionism 
and conflicts between mandatory rules and would weaken the predictability of the outcome of the award, just 
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arbitrator must apply all foreign mandatory rules is unwarranted. An arbitrator should never 
be obligated to apply foreign mandatory rules, or give them effect under the otherwise 
applicable law, just because one of the parties relies on them.340 What should be asked, is 
which foreign rules should an arbitrator apply? There must thus be some way for the 
arbitrator to exercise discretion over the applicable foreign mandatory rules.  
First, before examining the theory of foreign mandatory rules and the manners in which 
arbitrators may exercise discretion over the rules in a more strict sense of the word, one 
should examine what effect the national public policies of the potential places of 
enforcement and annulation proceedings may have on the parties' relationship. The rules that 
may be used to set aside or deny recognition and enforcement of an award, as discussed in 
the previous main chapter, could also be considered and given effect in the arbitral tribunal 
if the arbitrator wishes to render an effective award that will not be set aside or denied 
recognition. What effect should they be given by the arbitrator? 
4.5.3 Mandatory rules of lex arbitri and place of enforcement 
Besides transnational public policy considerations, it may be argued that the notion of public 
policy, as it is applied in the setting aside and enforcement proceedings, should affect the 
arbitrator's discretion as to ensure the award's enforceability.341 One could argue that the 
trade sanctions, or any other mandatory rules of the lex arbitri should affect the arbitrator's 
discretion since they may affect the award's validity, yet cannot be considered through the 
datum approach. Even if one were to consider trade sanctions as foreign mandatory rules, 
the enforceability concerns are a real issue that must be considered to ensure efficient 
procedure and adequate legal protection to the parties. 
Indeed, arbitration's greatest advantages over traditional commercial litigation, its speed and 
efficiency, would be greatly undermined if public policy and mandatory rule related issues 
would need to be independently assessed in ex post judicial challenges and if the arbitrator 
                                                 
to name some of the flaws of this type of argumentation. For further criticism, see Barraclough – Waincymer 
2005, pp. 21–22. 
340 Lazareff 1995, p. 143. 
341 See i.a. Hobér 2011, p. 55 who considers that only the truly international public policy and the mandatory 
rules of places of arbitration and enforcement would even in principle be able to limit the party autonomy in 
the choice of law. Hobér, however, concludes that the latter category should not in the end be given any effect. 
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was deprived of the possibility consider rules of the seat or potential places of 
enforcement.342 It should be in the parties' as well as in the arbitrator's interest to carry out 
the proceedings as efficiently as possible, and also, to avoid the publicity related to the 
setting aside or enforcement proceedings and to avoid the potentially notable costs 
associated with it.343 Therefore, also considering the mandatory rules of the seat and those 
of potential places of enforcement should be in the interests of the parties as well as the 
arbitrator.344 As considering all possible places of enforcement and their public policies is 
typically an impossible scenario, it has been suggested that only probable places of 
enforcement would have to be taken into account in the assessment.345 In many cases, for 
example the location of the assets under dispute may indicate the future places of 
enforcement. 
The type of argumentation that requires the arbitrator give special weight to the public 
policies of the seat and the place(s) of enforcement, has been applied in a number of arbitral 
awards.346 In these cases it has often been argued that a foreign mandatory rule would have 
to be applied in order to ensure the enforceability of the award. Article 41 ICC Rules, reading 
"[i]n all matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal 
shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is 
enforceable at law" is also often applied in these cases.347 Some argue that the said Article 
41 would impose the tribunal an obligation to render an enforceable award. 348  If the 
arbitrator would consider himself bound to render an enforceable award, this would also 
imply that he would be under an obligation to consider the possible public policy scrutiny in 
national courts, as discussed above. This would mean, that the arbitrator could be bound to 
apply EU public policies, potentially including trade sanctions that are included in the laws 
of the potential places of enforcement and the seat of arbitration. 
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343 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 215. 
344 See however Hobér 2011, p. 55 who argues that enforceability issues should not be given weight as the 
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The reading of the Article 41 ICC Rules according to which the arbitrator is under a duty 
render an enforceable award, has, however, been widely deemed incorrect. The said article 
only obliges the tribunal to make every effort to achieve enforceability and further, such 
efforts must only be made when a matter not expressly provided for in the Rules is at hand.349 
Nevertheless, at least in awards where recognition and enforcement would have with relative 
certainty been denied in national courts, the arbitrator seems to be eligible to give at least 
some effect to the mandatory rule.350 
The ICC Rules contain also another, peculiar feature typical to the ICC Rules, to ascertain 
the enforceability of an award. 351  According to Article 33 ICC Rules, before finally 
rendering the award the draft award is reviewed by the secretariat of the ICC. During the 
revision, the Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the award and, without 
affecting the arbitral tribunal’s liberty of decision, may also draw its attention to points of 
substance. Further, according to Appendix II, Article 6 of the ICC Rules, "[w]hen the 
[secretariat] scrutinizes draft awards in accordance with Article 33 of the Rules, it 
considers, to the extent practicable, the requirements of mandatory law at the place of the 
arbitration." The wording would seem to imply that, at least under the ICC Rules, mandatory 
rules of law at the place of arbitration should be considered. It should however be noted that 
the wording merely requires the Court to consider them and even that only to the extent 
practicable. Additionally, even if the Court would draw the tribunal's attention to such 
mandatory rules, the tribunal would be under no obligation to apply them. Further, according 
to an ICC commentary to the ICC Rules, the rules should be interpreted so that the 
substantive mandatory rules of the seat may be considered only if they have a close 
connection with the parties' dispute.352 This would imply that the rules of the seat would 
have to be comply with the same or at least similar requirements as all other foreign 
mandatory rules.353 
                                                 
349 Derains – Schwartz 2005, p. 384 and Fry et al. 2012, pp. 422–423. FAI Rules (Article 50) as well as SCC 
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352 Fry et al. 2012, p. 226. 
353 On the requirements, see chapter 4.5.4 below. 
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Notwithstanding the specific provisions of the ICC Rules, the risk of public policy based 
annulment or non-enforcement of the award could, however, serve as a last resort limitation 
to the arbitrators' discretion and the rules applied by national courts could serve as a tool for 
the arbitrator when considering the applicability of mandatory rules in arbitral 
proceedings. 354  This could especially be true in cases where the non-enforceability 
constitutes an inevitable consequence of rendering an award.355  
However, it could also be asserted that an arbitrator should not preventively apply any such 
foreign public policies just in order to ensure enforceability, since the primary concern of 
the arbitrator should not be to render an enforceable award, but rather the correct one.356 
Under this conception, the parties would have to bear the risk of non-enforceability by taking 
relevant matters into account when entering first into an agreement and choosing the 
applicable law. It could be argued that an arbitrator should under no circumstances be 
entitled to alter this allocation of risk between the parties.357 Too liberal an application of 
foreign public policies would easily constitute an undermining of the parties' autonomy and 
narrow down the legal predictability of the award. Further, considering only the mandatory 
rules of the place of arbitration and enforcement may easily be interpreted as favoring the 
mandatory rules of these states over others'.358  
However, if the risk of non-enforceability and the potentially large costs related to it may be 
avoided through simple consideration of the relevant mandatory rules at the stage of 
arbitration, it may be asked, why should an arbitrator not consider such rules? It should be 
clear that the public policies of the countries of place of arbitration and the probable places 
of enforcement should be considered already at the stage of arbitration, as not to give rise to 
unnecessary suits of annulation or non-enforcement. 359  This should be a matter of 
professional pride, rather than a strict obligation for the arbitrator.360 This conclusion does 
not, however, mean that all mandatory rules of the places of arbitration and enforcement 
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should be applied automatically, but rather that the risk of annulation and non-enforcement 
should be duly considered and its effect taken into account.  
Indeed, only in cases where the non-application of mandatory rules of the arbitral seat or the 
place of enforcement would with relative certainty lead to non-enforceability, should such 
rules be taken into account by the arbitrator.361 However, should the threshold for certainty 
of non-enforcement not be met, the likely non-enforceability may also serve as a proof of 
the application-worthiness of the mandatory rule, under the special connection method, 
discussed below.362 With the expansionist notions of public policy in the CJEU363, and as a 
consequence, in national courts in Europe, these considerations may play increasingly large 
role in the future. If the national courts or the CJEU would deem trade sanctions to constitute 
public policy, the arbitrator should be able to consider these trade sanctions already during 
the main proceedings. Arbitrators should not knowingly render unenforceable awards. The 
notion of public policy at the seat of arbitration and at the places of enforcement, as predicted 
by the arbitrator, should in this way form a minimum level of the public policy control by 
the arbitrator who should take reasonable measures to predict the probable places of 
enforcement and their position in relation to public policy matters. 
4.5.4 Special connection method 
If the arbitrator wishes not to address issues of trade sanctions through the datum method or 
by considering the public policies of places of seat and enforcement of the award, further 
tools may developed to answer the dilemma. Indeed, even in these cases not all trade 
sanctions or other mandatory rules that claim applicability should be applied. The literature 
has hence prescribed some general methods for exercising discretion over the applicability 
of foreign mandatory rules. A number of authors and arbitrators have attempted to find the 
applicable foreign mandatory rules through analogous application of Article 7(1) Rome 
                                                 
361 In this assessment the arbitrator should, among other things, consider whether the potential place(s) of 
enforcement tend to refuse enforcement to arbitral awards set aside at the place of arbitration. On this, see 
chapter 3.3.1 above. 
362 See Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 162–163 and chapter 4.5.4 below. 
363 See chapter 3.4.2 above. 
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Convention, or equivalent rules of private international law364, through the so called special 
connection method. 365 According to Article 7(1) Rome Convention: 
When applying under this Convention the law of a country, effect may be given 
to the mandatory rules of the law of another country with which the situation has 
a close connection, if and in so far as, under the law of the latter country, those 
rules must be applied whatever the law applicable to the contract. In considering 
whether to give effect to these mandatory rules, regard shall be had to their 
nature and purpose and to the consequences of their application or non-
application. 
Before looking into what requirements Article 7(1) Rome Convention and the special 
connection method sets for the application of foreign mandatory rules, a brief excursion is 
in place to uncover what is meant in the said Article 7(1) by giving effect, as opposed to 
applying. The choice of words seems to imply that courts should be left with some discretion 
in applying the foreign mandatory provisions and combining them with the applicable law, 
sort of a middle ground between purely applying and not applying at all.366 The Giuliano–
Lagarde Report, a preparatory works for the Rome Convention, further states that "the words 
'effect may be given' impose on the Court the extremely delicate task of combining the 
mandatory provisions with the law normally applicable to the contract in the particular 
                                                 
364  Most notably, see Article 19 SPILA, containing provisions essentially similar to Article 7(1) Rome 
Convention. Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation, contains also a similar provision. The requirements for 
considering foreign mandatory rules under it are however in one manner notably dissimilar: Rome I Regulation 
only allows consideration of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the country where the 
obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed, in so far as those overriding 
mandatory provisions render the performance of the contract unlawful. Therefore, under Rome I Regulation, 
in a way not dissimilar to the force majeure approach discussed above, effect could be given only to those rules 
that would affect the performance of the contract. For this reason, the special connection test has in literature 
been based on the Rome Convention and its Article 7(1). 
365 See at least Azeredo da Silveria 2014, p. 127–190; Barraclough – Waincymer 2005; p. 228–233 and 
Blessing 1997, pp. 32–33. Besides the special connection method, at least one other method of exercising 
discretion over foreign mandatory rules has emerged. The so-called legitmate expectations test is based on 
balancing the parties' expectations on the one hand and the legitimacy of the interest protected by the mandatory 
rule on the other. This method in most cases very much resembles the transnational public policy method 
presented above and does not as such, however, offer much additional discretion in determining the 
applicability of foreign mandatory rules. (Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp. 234). For these reasons, the 
method does not as such offer much help in disentangling issues of foreign mandatory rules, and will thus not 
be discussed below. 
366 Marchand 2012, p. 225. 
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situation in question".367 In an early commentary, van Hecke has however suggested that the 
choice of words, giving effect, as opposed to applying, would mean that arbitrators should 
consider the mandatory rules as force majeure events and that even in such case, the 
arbitrator would be bound to consider all the factors required by the Article 7(1), i.e. the 
closeness of the connections, the mandatory nature and most notably the nature and the 
purpose of the law.368 Such view has been contested in later doctrine. Question whether a 
given situation constitutes a force majeure impediment must be answered through the 
provisions of lex causae, and should not be subject to a test of legitimacy beyond the control 
of transnational public policy. Force majeure provisions do not normally require the 
impediment to be "legitimate".369 Therefore, giving effect should not be interpreted as to 
mean taking into account the otherwise applicable law.  
We now come back to the theory of special connection, or Sonderanknüpfungstheorie, the 
contents of which are essentially laid out in the above provision of the Rome Convention. 
The Article 7(1) contains three different elements or branches. According to it, to establish 
that a foreign mandatory should be applied in a given case, regard shall be given to: 
1. the mandatory nature of the law;  
2. a close connection between the rule and the dispute at hand; and 
3. the application-worthiness of the rule, i.e. the nature and purpose of the law and the 
consequences of its application or non-application.370 
The mandatory nature requirement of the rule does not typically pose problems with regard 
to trade sanctions. Trade sanctions by nature claim wide applicability,371 and thus even if not 
explicitly stated, strive to apply to all contractual relationships within their purview, 
regardless of any choice of law by the parties.372 They typically are mandatory rules by 
definition. 
                                                 
367 Article 7 paragraph 3 of the Giuliano–Lagarde Report. 
368 Van Hecke 1984–1985, p. 117. 
369 Marchand 2012, pp. 230–232. 
370 Generally on the application of the special connection test, see at least Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 133–
147 and on the actual application of the test i.a. ICC Awards 6294 and 6500. Some authors have formed the 
branches differently, but the essential contents of the list nonetheless remain same, reflecting i.a. Article 7(1) 
Rome Convention and Article 19 SPILA. On this, see e.g. Blessing 1999, p. 62-63. 
371 See chapter 2.1 above. 
372 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 61. 
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The close connection test with regard to non-extraterritorial application of trade sanctions, 
i.e. whether the dispute at hand and the contemplated mandatory rule are adequately closely 
connected, also does not pose many problems. If the contract or a part of it has to be 
performed, or a party must take measures under the contract within the territory of the state 
that has enacted the alleged mandatory rule, a close connection must be at hand. 373 
Therefore, in cases where the performance is impeded by the sanction (and could clearly 
also be interpreted as causing a force majeure impediment) the close connection must exist.  
As for extraterritorial trade sanctions, i.e. those that claim applicability not based on their 
effect in the performance of the parties contract but on other grounds, such as the nationality 
of the parties, attention must be drawn to some further possible criteria. According to the 
Giuliano – Lagarde Report, a close connection may exist if one of the parties is domiciled or 
has its place of business in the state that has enacted the rule.374 As presented by arbitral 
practice, this does not, however, mean that the arbitrators would always have to consider 
that a close connection exists.375 It is rather generally required that the foreign mandatory 
rule has a connection with the contract as a whole and that the connection is a genuine 
connection.376 
It has been asserted that a trade sanction cannot be taken into account when its scope exceeds 
that permitted by international law.377 Hence, as for truly extraterritorial trade sanctions, a 
close connection cannot be deemed to exist if the arbitral tribunal has concluded that the 
sanctioning state should not under the rules of public international law be allowed to 
prescribe such extraterritorial rules. 378  Reference to public international law does not, 
however, offer definite answers, since as noted above, the jurisdiction to prescribe rules has 
                                                 
373 Voser 1996, p. 346; Waincymer 2009, p. 32 as well as Azeredo da Silveria 2014, pp. 143–144, and the 
referred ICC Awards 4132 and 6500. See also similar provision in Article 9(3) Rome I Regulation that does 
not require a close connection but instead allows only application of foreign mandatory rules “of the law of the 
country where the obligations arising out of the contract have to be or have been performed” must be 
considered. Notably, the scope of close connection is much narrower with regard to Rome I regulation than 
that of the Rome Convention.  
374 Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Giuliano–Lagarde Report. 
375  Amsterdam Grain Trade Association, Award of 11 January 1982, where Austrian exchange  control 
regulations were not deemed to have a close enough connection with the dispute between Austrian and Dutch 
parties when the transaction took place in the Netherlands and no other sufficient connection to the parties’ 
dispute was proved to exist. 
376 Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Giuliano–Lagarde Report. 
377 Van Hecke 1984–1985, p. 119. 
378 Van Houtte 1997, p. 168. 
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not been defined unanimously in national laws and the manner in which countries define 
their jurisdiction under international law differs from one state to another.379 Further, even 
when discussing states' jurisdiction to prescribe extraterritorial statutes under the rules of 
international law, one of the exigencies for the jurisdiction has been said to be the close 
connection between states.380 This may lead to a stalemate where it is extremely difficult to 
conclusively define when a close connection is at hand. However, if a trade sanction has no 
connection to the territory, the nationality or residence, or the security interests of the 
sanctioning state, and the application or non-application of the sanction would have no 
effects on the territory of the sanctioning state, no close connection can be deemed to exist, 
and as a consequence, the rule should not be applied in the parties' relationship.381 
Furthermore, substantive public policies of the seat of arbitration do not necessarily have a 
close connection only because they form a part of the lex arbitri.382 If one were to strictly 
follow the special connection method, the mandatory rules of the lex arbitri should be 
considered like any other foreign mandatory rules and only be given effect if they have some 
other close connection with the parties' dispute. They may nevertheless have an effect if they 
would materially affect the enforceability of the award, as discussed above.383 
The third arm of the theory of special connection, the application-worthiness test, largely 
corresponds to the test of application-worthiness described above in relation to non-
application of certain unilateral trade sanctions due to transnational public policies.384 In a 
                                                 
379 See chapter 2.1 above. 
380 Brownlie 2008, p. 312. 
381 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, pp. 175–176. See also the referred Sensor decision (Compagnie Europeenne 
des Petroles S.A. v. Sensor Nederland B. V) where American export prohibitions were disregarded in a 
Dutch court based on a lack of close connection with the parties dispute. The court examined the principles of 
nationality (none of the parties was from US and the court deemed that the "control theory" applied in American 
sanctions did not justify the application of the sanctions under international law), protection (court deemed that 
the category of security interests did not include the foreign policy interests that the US sanctions protected) 
and effects (the court held that the sanctions did not have any direct effect on US territory). Hence, the court 
concluded that US sanctions regulations against the USSR lacked a close connection with the parties' dispute. 
382 Voser 1996, pp. 346–347. 
383 See i.a. the Amsterdam Grain Association Award of 11 January 1982 in which it the tribunal considered the 
effects of potential non-enforceability of the award when deciding whether to apply or not a foreign mandatory 
rule. 
384 In fact, the question of non-application of the unilateral sanction of the lex causae based on transnational 
public policy may actually be viewed as a question of the application-worthiness of the unilateral embargo 
against the standards of transnational public policy. With regard to sanctions in lex causae, the close connection 
and mandatory nature arms of the special connection test are easily satisfied, since the lex causae naturally has 
a close connection with the parties' dispute and since the sanction presumptively is a mandatory rule in the 
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way similar to assessment of application-worthiness under the transnational public policy 
exception, the arbitrator should pay heed to the underlying purpose and nature of the rule, 
how widely such rule has been implemented and what the actual effects of its application or 
non-application are. However, when a unilateral sanction is embodied in the lex causae, the 
general presumption should be the application of the sanction, whereas when the sanction is 
embodied in a foreign law, this presupposition should be overturned and the foreign law 
applied only in exceptional cases. Applying the public policy or foreign mandatory rule 
should be an exception to the main rule. 
With regard to the purpose and nature of the sanction, the threshold should be the same as it 
is with regard to the transnational public policy control. Both in relation to transnational 
public policy as well as in relation to foreign mandatory rules, the protected interest should 
be adequately legitimate as to overturn the parties' choice of law and their legitimate 
interests. In assessing the underlying nature and purpose of the rule, similar matters such as 
rules of international law may be taken into account. For example in cases where the UNGA 
has condemned a trade sanction, its application could with relative certainty deemed 
inappropriate.385 
Also similarly to the transnational public policy exception, the actual outcome of the 
application will all things considering have to be appropriate, and regard must be given to 
the consequences of application and non-application of the rule. Hence, if the measure does 
not effectively protect the intended public interest, it should not be applied. This assessment 
could also include considering the potential control at the setting aside or recognition and 
enforcement judiciaries.386  
The level of universal acceptance of the rule should not, however, be given as much value 
as in the transnational public policy assessment. A mandatory rule, or trade sanction, may 
                                                 
applicable law. Some authors have indeed contended that all mandatory rules, those pertaining to lex causae 
as well as all others, should be treated equal so that no law would have a presumptive priority over others and 
that the rules of lex causae should go through the same scrutiny as all other mandatory rules. See Voser 1996, 
pp. 339–340. For a contrary view, see Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, pp. 220–221.  
385 See for example the US embargo against Cuba that has been multiple times been condemned by the UNGA 
and the resolutions referred to in footnote 294 above. Similarly, as discussed above in relation to transnational 
public policy, if the trade sanction is based on a non-binding resolution of the UNSC or the UNGA, the sanction 
should as a general rule be deemed to serve a legitimate purpose. See Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 154. 
386 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 146 and chapter 4.5.3 above. 
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serve a legitimate interest and be given effect as a foreign mandatory rule, even if it is not 
universally shared.387 The protected interest as such should, nonetheless, be shared by the 
international community as such. Such sanctions, representing universally recognized 
legally protected interests could come into play and be used to interfere with the parties 
choice of law.388 Additionally, for example, it could be possible that a country would impose 
unilateral sanctions and only later would the actions of the sanctioned state be deemed 
inappropriate by the UNSC. Universal protection may nonetheless serve as a sign that the 
rule protects a legitimate interest but does not as such does not guarantee its legitimacy.389 
Despite these considerations on the special connection method and foreign mandatory rules 
in general, it should be again emphasized that in vast majority of cases relating to trade 
sanctions, the arbitrator should refrain from employing the foreign mandatory rules method. 
The arbitrator should beware of becoming a mere guardian of values of personal morality, 
which he is not. The exceptions of transnational public policy and the indirect method offer 
the arbitrator with a generally sufficient toolbox to tackle the issues of trade sanctions and 
public policy. Most authors as well as arbitral tribunals have refrained from resorting to this 
type of choice of law analysis, where possible. 
                                                 
387 Azeredo da Silveira 2014, p. 156. 
388 See chapter 4.3.4 and Voser 1996, p. 351. 
389 Barraclough – Waincymer 2005, p. 231. 
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5 Conclusions 
 Summary of findings 
The above has demonstrated some of the problems and attempted to provide clarity to 
questions of choice of law and enforceability in disputes relating to trade sanctions. 
Questions of trade sanctions face the classical dilemma of international arbitration and public 
law issues: the parties’ autonomy and their interests may go against the will of sovereign 
states. As may be clearly observed from the above, it is a tough task to present a 
comprehensive solution for the questions that would cure all issues and provide a watertight 
answer to the problem. The above presented framework has, however, attempted to 
systematize different types of trade sanctions and the different situations in which they may 
become applicable. 
This study firstly discussed the general framework of different types of trade sanctions. In 
terms of types of trade sanctions, the most significant choice of law and enforceability issues 
pertain to the distinction between multilateral and unilateral trade sanctions. Multilateral 
trade sanctions are based on UN decisions whereas unilateral sanctions are not. It was also 
noted that practically all trade sanctions in Finland are implemented through certain EU 
mechanisms and that with the rise of EU’s CSFP, non-EU sanctions are have become 
practically extinct in Finland. Also, some brief remarks regarding arbitrability of trade 
sanctions related disputes were made, and it was concluded that one should, as a general 
rule, be able to resolve issues pertaining to trade sanctions through means of international 
arbitration. 
The research question pertaining to setting aside as well as recognizing and enforcing trade 
sanctions related awards was examined in the third main chapter of this study. First, a general 
framework for the purpose of understanding issues of public policy was presented. 
According to the presented systematization, public policies may affect the decision-making 
of national judiciaries as fundamental principles, public policy rules (mandatory rules) or as 
states’ international obligations. The procedural framework in which Finnish public policy 
may become applicable was discussed in the following subchapter. It was here concluded 
that the notion of public policy in relation to setting aside proceedings on the one hand and 
recognition and enforcement procedures on the other are essentially similar.  
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The scope of national, material public policy in Finnish judiciaries was concluded to be 
narrow yet still covering certain cases where the award would otherwise lead to illegality 
and to a contravention with Finnish law. This way, in a mostly hypothetical scenario, a 
Finnish trade sanction could be deemed to form an autonomous national public policy that 
could be used to set aside or refuse recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award. It was 
thereafter concluded that national courts should as a general rule only pay attention to their 
own respective public policies and disregard the mandatory laws of other states. Therefore, 
public policies originating from a third country should not be given effect in national 
judiciaries. The purpose of the public policy control in national judiciaries is to control the 
compliance with certain fundamental legal and moral standards of that state. It should thus 
not be the mission of the judge to find the materially correct solution and to balance the 
parties' interests, but rather only to ensure the compliance with the public policy of that 
country.  
Since trade sanctions normally originate from the EU, a review of the scope of EU public 
policy was made. It was concluded that in national courts, the general trend has led to a 
narrow interpretation of public policy and general rule of enforceability and validity of the 
award, whereas the EU has favored an expansive notion of public policies whereby large 
categories of rules may potentially be applied as public policies. It was argued that if EU 
judiciaries were to face a request for a preliminary ruling regarding the public policy status 
of EU trade sanctions, they could easily incline towards non-enforcement or invalidity of the 
award based on the alleged public policy status of the said restrictive measures.  
The research question pertaining to trade sanctions in arbitral tribunals was discussed in the 
fourth main chapter. Two different main methods for considering issues of trade sanctions 
were discussed: the transnational public policy method and the foreign mandatory rules 
method. It was first asserted that the existence of a transnational public policy method as 
such is not questioned, but that the extent to which it should be used in uncertain. This study 
then proceeded to propose a solution on the interpretation of transnational public policies 
based on a test of application-worthiness: a balancing of interests behind the sanction on the 
one hand, and the interests of the parties and their contractual autonomy on the other hand. 
This happened by considering the apparent legitimacy of the sanction, the wideness of its 
applicability as well as the consequences of its application or non-application. It was 
concluded that at the very least multilateral sanctions may be applied as transnational public 
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policy. Also other sanctions may in given rare situations be affected by transnational public 
policy considerations. 
Before dealing with the questions of foreign mandatory rules, it was discussed whether 
arbitrators should at all consider trade sanctions as choice of law issues, or rather only as 
issues of nullity or force majeure under the otherwise applicable law. It was argued that the 
method of indirect application, considering trade sanctions as mere facts under the otherwise 
applicable law would provide consistent outcomes and avoid the troublesome choice of law 
issues that would often arise with regard to trade sanctions, and should thus be preferred. 
Even if the force majeure method was noted to be the preferred method in most situations, 
it was also noted that the foreign mandatory rules method could prove useful in certain cases.  
Issues of foreign mandatory rules were discussed in the final subchapters of this study. First, 
the public policies of the place of arbitration as well as those of potential places of arbitration 
were discussed. It was concluded that the arbitrator should indeed take note of these public 
policies and give them effect where they would probably risk rendering the award 
unenforceable or void. The mandatory rules of these or other places may also be given effect 
through the so-called special connection test: by considering the mandatory nature of the 
applicable provision of law, the closeness of its connection with the parties’ dispute as well 
as the application-worthiness of that rule. The numerous uncertainties regarding the method 
however imply that it should be applied only where truly necessary.  
 Concluding remarks 
Despite some historically notable sanctions regimes now gradually being dismantled, the big 
picture seems to indicate the growing global significance of trade sanctions. Even the 
sanctions regimes against Cuba and Iran, both bound to be overridden in the coming years, 
will still affect the trade with these states for years and further their reversal is subject to 
strict clawback provisions.390 The newer sanction regimes are both broad and restrictive in 
their scope. Trade sanctions seem to have come to stay. 
                                                 
390 The Economist, 25 July 2015. 
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Therefore, despite the fact that it is exceptionally difficult to grasp the contents and the very 
core of the issues and to present general solutions applicable in all situations, one should not 
give in before the broad uncertainties regarding the fundamental questions of jurisdiction 
and choice of law. Understanding these issues is essential for understanding how trade 
sanctions may have effect on the parties’ relationship. The national judiciaries in 
enforcement and setting aside proceedings are in this sense in more fortunate position. They 
merely serve the purpose of protecting the notions of morality and justice as they are known 
in that certain country. Therefore, the notion of public policy may in most cases be used give 
effect to trade sanctions, without having to resort to complex assessment of the legitimacy 
of several laws and their merits. The court must only follow its own procedural law. 
International arbitrator on the other hand should be independent of national public policies 
and follow the will of the parties. This may prove to be problematic since the general 
framework of choice of law within which the arbitrator works is far from clear and concise. 
Different schools of thought promote different solutions and none of them may be deemed 
completely correct or incorrect. This puts the arbitrator, just like the author attempting to 
present a more concise picture of the realm of international arbitration, in a difficult position. 
This study argued for relatively wide and unconditional contractual freedom for the parties 
to choose the law (and the trade sanctions therein) applicable to their dispute. It was argued 
that only when supranationally shared values are at stake should the arbitrator interfere with 
the parties’ freedom and that otherwise the arbitrator should avoid resorting to unnecessary 
assessments of the legitimacy of trade sanctions in competing laws. 
These reached conclusions are obviously based on contractual and autonomous notions of 
the nature of international arbitration.391 Had one built one’s argumentation on different 
premises, emphasizing more the sovereign right to impose laws within their competence and 
less the parties’ autonomy, one could also have argued for a more jurisdictional solution 
whereby the interests protected by more numerous trade sanctions should be given effect by 
deeming them directly applicable in the parties’ relationship. This other solution too, based 
on the foreign mandatory rules method and on a more jurisdictional view of international 
                                                 
391 On the different notions of the fundamental nature of international arbitration, see chapter 1.3 above. 
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arbitration, can and has been quite convincingly argued.392 As was already argued above, the 
intrinsic multiplicity of international arbitration and the unresolved questions regarding its 
essential nature make it possible to have a multiplicity of legitimate and well-founded 
solutions. 
Be the chosen method for examining these issues whatever it may, the use of trade sanctions, 
multilateral or unilateral, is always an exceptional situation which requires a delicate 
balancing of interests and consideration of the unique facts of each case. Therefore, 
arbitrators as well as the national judges in enforcement or setting aside proceedings should 
make their best efforts reach an equitable outcome that balances the manifold interests and 
arguments in the best possible way. For the time being, not even a silver bullet method, let 
alone a solution, exists for exercising this discretion. 
                                                 
392 See i.a. Azeredo da Silveira 2014, especially pp. 35–64. 
